# Repudiate Drones 1AC

## 1AC

### Adv 1

#### Contention 1: Drones are legal

#### This white paper sets forth a legal framework for considering lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen, who is a force of al-Qa'ida planning to kill Americans. Congress authorized the President to use all necessary force against those entities. See AUMF. The President's use of force is lawful under U.S. and international law, including constitutional responsibility to protect the nation and national self-defense. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51. A U.S. citizen would not alter this conclusion. See Hamdi. Ex Parte Quirin. The U S is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa'ida. See Hamdan, quoting Article 3 of Geneva. It would be lawful for the U S to conduct lethal operation under the following conditions: (1) the U.S. government has determined that the individual poses an imminent threat (2) capture is infeasible and (3) the operation is consistent with the laws of war

#### That was a secret White House memo that got leaked in 2013

#### This law of targeted killing can only be understood as a function of contingent practice ---- we have scholarly obligations to utilize this 1AC to discuss how we bring that knowledge into play through a re-reading of the law and the method to change law

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(Susanne, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship”, Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pp. 665–682, dml)

It was only with President Barack Obama’s ‘drone program’30 that targeted killing operations were systematically and more openly employed in the fight against terrorism. Since Obama entered office, there has reportedly been a conspicuous increase of aerial strikes, mainly in Pakistan. Targeted killing became a subject of public knowledge and thus publicly visible.31 As a security technology assigned to the context of military operations, the term itself then came to represent a rather new phenomenon of (mainly drone-launched) air strikes on a foreign territory – which, of course, does not preclude intelligence continuing to play a crucial role in the fight against terrorism and accomplishing respective missions.32 Yet, within the ‘theatre of war’, as this telling phrase indicates, the practice of killing political opponents takes an entirely different shape. The exercise of sovereign power sees itself authorized to address corresponding bodies of law, notably around ‘self-defence’ and ‘armed conflict’. It is with these legal references that a justification of (TKOs) Targeted Killing Operations apparently ceases to be required, according to US State Department Legal Advisor Harald S. Koh: Some have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force.33 At the very same moment as targeted killing entered the public stage, it became legalizable. It did so as a security dispositif by locating itself within the legal discourse and at the same time relocating elementary conceptions of existing international law. It was the identification of a new dimension of threats that, in the first instance, paved the way for targeted killing’s surfacing on the political and legal stage. With the ability to utilize weapons of mass destruction or to display the capacity to invent such weapons, contemporary terrorism has been perceived as competing with the destructive power of states and, at the same time,34 being organized in transnationally operating networks, as an unforeseeable threat. The rationale of facing this threat no longer consists of deterring the attack by a known enemy state, but of pre-empting ‘the danger before it is known’ and before it has a chance to even emerge.35 If international law was prepared to accommodate targeted killing in legal terms, this was also the case because radical uncertainty, in the sense of the unforeseeable and possible, had already been introduced into legal reasoning.36 The precautionary logic constitutes a crucial feature of the new security dispositif – and a condition of possibility for targeted killing to be embraced by international law. As a dispositif, targeted killing entails the claim of its being an appropriate response to the new dimension of threats. Its promise is that a limited, or ‘surgical’, intervention brings about the greatest effects. The rationale is to intercept, or preempt, any preparatory terrorist action and thereby figure out the source of the problem – in the present context, leaders and core figures of a terrorist organization – in order to disrupt the whole matter. Terror networks, through this lens, then, appear to be the mirror image of this dispositif. Rather than merely being a response to the presumed problem, targeted killing asserts that this kind of organization would in fact be its very structure. It thus relocates the legal notions of war and self defence, once clearly attributable to ‘the political space of sovereignty’,37 within an entirely new constellation. What is at stake is no longer the idea of a confrontation between states, but rather the concerted acts of individuals. If targeted killing could re-emerge as a new phenomenon and legitimate subject of legal debate, gradually losing resemblance to the classical forms of political assassination, this induced a distinctive kind of politico-legal question. The fight against terrorism, namely, is to be assigned to the legal sphere of either warfare or crime control. This decision makes a considerable difference as regards both the rights of state authorities to exercise lethal force and the due-process guarantees of the impacted individuals.38 It is, however, only the traditional notion of sovereign states that suggests a clear distinction be made between foreign and internal affairs, military and criminal cases, war- and peacetime, in accordance with bodies of law. Reluctance to accept targeted killing as a legitimate measure, even when basically assenting to ‘the morality of killing in the context of war’,39 within this framework seems quite rational – that is to say, once targeted killing is regarded as being an instrument of ordinary law enforcement.40 Those clear distinctions, however, have always been an idealization. Wartime, which is thought of as an exception to the norm, intrudes into everyday life through both memories and anticipation.41 The presence of past wars in public debates is as much a testimony to this phenomenon as current political invocations to prepare for the next attack. There is also continuity between war- and peacetime that is reinforced by technologies and institutions.42 The convertibility of military into civilian techniques, and vice versa, is to mention just one facet: the possible double use of drones in war- and in peace times another. It is only the awareness of boundaries being blurred that is a rather recent phenomenon.43 And, in fact, to the extent that targeted killing replaces the notion of assassination, the targets themselves are no longer civilian political leaders, but terrorists44 – a term that comes to be located within the juridical debate beyond the distinction of soldier or civilian. If targeted killing today in the fight against terrorism appears to be an appropriate security technology, embedded within international law, this acceptance in turn is evidence of a new security dispositif’s becoming the norm. Within a Foucauldian perspective, talk about a new security dispositif does not imply that one dispositif would replace the other altogether, but rather that established notions and practices become relocated and linked to new ones. Sovereign power thus in no way loses its significance, but sees itself confronted with new challenges and obligations, and endowed with new momentums of authorization. Targeted killing, in this sense, itself shapes state formation,45 namely our understanding of sovereignty, of the rule of law, and of what is a legal and an illegal practice. Rather than asking whether international law competes with the sovereignty of states, focus, within this perspective, is on how sovereignty transforms and constitutes itself anew by enforcing international law; how distinctions are being made, for example, between national and international legal matters or between laws of war and ordinary law enforcement; and what kinds of concept underlie legal norms and are being inscribed into the law. 3. A FOUCAULDIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LAW Foucault did not elaborate on a comprehensive theory of law – a fact that critics have attributed to his allegedly underestimating law’s political and social relevance. Some statements by Foucault may have provoked this interpretation, among them his assertion that law historically ‘recedes’with,46 or is being ‘colonized’ by,47 forms of knowledge that are addressed at governing people and populations. It is, though, precisely this analytical perspective that allows us to capture the mutually productive relationship between targeted killing and the law. In contrast to a widely shared critique, then, Foucault did not read law merely as a negative instrument of constraint. He referred, instead, to a particular mode of juridical power that operates in terms of repressive effects.48Moreover, rather than losing significance coextensively with the ancient sovereign power, law enters new alliances, particularly with certain knowledge practices and attendant expertise.49 This linkage proves to be relevant in the present context, considering not only the interchange between the legal and political discourse on targeted killing, but notably the relationship between law and security. According to Foucault, social phenomena cannot be isolated from and are only decipherable within the practices, procedures, and forms of knowledge that allow them to surface as such.50 In this sense, ‘all phenomena are singular, every historical or social fact is a singularity’.51Hence, they need to be studied within their historically and locally specific contexts, so as to account for both the subject’s singularity and the conditions of its emergence. It is against this background that a crucial question to be posed is how targeted killing could emerge on the political stage as a subject of legal debate. Furthermore, this analytical perspective on power and knowledge intrinsically being interlinked highlights that our access to reality always entails a productive moment. Modes of thinking, or what Foucault calls rationalities, render reality conceivable and thus manageable.52 They implicate certain ways of seeing things, and they induce truth effects whilst translating into practices and technologies of government. These do not merely address and describe their subject; they constitute or produce it.53 Law is to be approached accordingly.54 It cannot be extracted from the forms of knowledge that enact it, and it is in this sense that law is only conceivable as practice. Even if we only think of the law in ideal terms, as being designated to contain governmental interference, for example, or to provide citizens’ rights, it is already a practice and a form of enacting the law. To enforce the law is always a form of enactment, since it involves a productive moment of bringing certain forms of knowledge into play and of rendering legal norms meaningful in the first place. Law is susceptible to certain forms of knowledge and rationalities in a way that these constitute it and shape legal claims. Rather than on the application of norms, legal reasoning is on the production of norms. Legality, within this account of law, then, is not only due to a normative authority that, based in our political culture, is external to law, nor is it something that is just inherent in law, epitomized by the principles that constitute law’s ‘innermorality’.55 Rather, the enforcement of law and its attendant reasoning produce their own – legal – truth effects. Independently of the purported intentions of the interlocutors, the juridical discourse on targeted killing leads to, in the first instance, conceiving of and receiving the subject in legal terms. When targeted killing surfaced on the political stage, appropriate laws appeared to be already at hand. ‘There are more than enough rules for governing drone warfare’, reads the conclusion of a legal reasoning on targeted killing.56 Yet, accommodating the practice in legal terms means that international law itself is undergoing a transformation. The notion of dispositifs is useful in analysing such processes of transformation. It enables us to grasp the minute displacements of established legal concepts that,57 while undergoing a transformation, at the same time prove to be faithful to their previous readings. The displacement of some core features of the traditional conception of the modern state reframes the reading of existing law. Hence, to give just one example for such a rereading of international law: legal scholars raised the argument that neither the characterization of an international armed conflict holds – ‘since al Qaeda is not a state and has no government and is therefore incapable of fighting as a party to an inter-state conflict’58 – nor that of an internal conflict. Instead, the notion of dealing with a non-international conflict,59 which, in view of its global nature, purportedly ‘closely resembles’ an international armed conflict, serves to provide ‘a fuller and more comprehensive set of rules’.60 Established norms and rules of international law are preserved formally, but filled with a radically different meaning so as to eventually integrate the figure of a terrorist network into its conventional understanding. Legal requirements are thus meant to hold for a drone programme that is accomplished both by military agencies in war zones and by military and intelligence agencies targeting terror suspects beyond these zones,61 since the addressed is no longer a state, but a terrorist network. However, to conceive of law as a practice does not imply that law would be susceptible to any form of knowledge. Not only is its reading itself based on a genealogy of practices established over a longer period.62 Most notably, the respective forms of knowledge are also embedded in varying procedures and strategic configurations. If law is subject to an endless deference of meaning,63 this is not the case in the sense of arbitrary but historically contingent practices, but in the sense of historically contingent practices. Knowledge, then, is not merely an interpretive scheme of law. Rather than merely on meaning, [the] focus is on practices that, while materializing and producing attendant truth effects, shape the distinctions we make between legal and illegal measures. What is more, as regards anticipatory techniques to prevent future harm, this perspective allows for our scrutinizing the division made between what is presumably known and what is yet to be known, and between what is presumably unknown and has yet to be rendered intelligible. This prospect, as will be seen in the following, is crucial for a rereading of existing law. It was the identification of a new order of threat since the terror attacks of 9/11 that brought about a turning point in the reading of international law. The identification of threats in general provides a space for transforming the unknowable into new forms of knowledge. The indeterminateness itself of legal norms proves to be a tool for introducing a new reading of law**.**

### Adv 2

#### Thus,

#### Advocacy Statement: Lee and I believe the United States Federal Government’s legal authority for targeted killing should be repudiated

#### Repudiation is key ---- the authority to conduct drone strikes is the most problematic

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The first question Obama should clearly answer is where the administration derives the authority to engage in drone strikes against enemy combatants. The "white paper" outlining administration policy uncovered by Michael Isikoff was ambiguous, citing both the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) against Al-Qaeda and the president's inherent Article II powers. It is important to clarify the nature of the asserted power, particularly given the highly elastic definition of "imminent threat" the administration seems to be using. (Nobody disputes that Article II gives the president the authority to respond to genuinely imminent security threats, but it does not give the president the authority to kill people in pre-emptive response to speculative ones.) Admittedly, in the short term the specific legal basis cited by the administration will make no difference on the ground, since Congress has shown no inclination to revise the AUMF or otherwise constrain the president's authority to order extrajudicial killings of suspected terrorists abroad. But in the longer term, the source of authority claimed by the president matters. The Obama administration needs to clearly repudiate the Bush administration's excessively broad assertions of unilateral executive power. What's the Process? The most disturbing aspect of the extrajudicial killings that have been used frequently by the Obama administration as an antiterrorism tactic is the lack of transparency and due process. On a traditional battlefield, this is less problematic because the status of enemy combatants is clearly identified. But in the murkier world of counterterrorism—which has some elements of military policy when suspected terrorists are beyond the reach of state authorities but retains many elements of ordinary policing—the lack of due process is much more disturbing. The leaked white paper described at least some of the underlying theory, but a great deal of the process remains unclear. How is enemy combatant status determined? How can it be challenged? What are the circumstances in which extrajuridical killings are justified? And, most importantly, how can a process without judicial checks not create an unacceptable risk of errors? It should also be emphasized that Obama needs to adequately address not just questions of legal process but of policy process as well. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the existing system successfully identifies genuine security threats and targeting them is legally justified, this doesn't mean that particular target killings represent a wise course of action. One of the many defects of the Bush administration's excessively militarized counterterrorism policies is that they seemed premised on the idea that there were a finite number of terrorist threats and the threat could therefore be ended by military action. The reality is more complex: military action leads to opposition that might breed two or three terrorists for every one killed, as well as making states less willing to work with the American government in other areas. There is at least some reason to believe that the drone strikes are generating increased hostility to the United States that might ultimately undermine national security. The Obama administration(‘s) has avoided a foreign-policy catastrophe on the scale of Iraq, but its excessive faith in the efficacy of military force has regrettable similarities with the previous administration's thinking. Obama's speech needs to face these questions head-on, and hopefully will announce a shift away from the use of military attacks to right terrorism.

#### This is contention 2: the global is now the local

#### Our advocacy begins with a criticism of drones ---- the argument is not that drones are the only way to create effective discussion surrounding violence and oppression, but it is ONE important starting method! Specifically, this discussion is critical to further interrogate the post-colonial legacy that the US military complex perpetrates

#### As scholars, the discussions and knowledge we produce about the impacts of drones are key because epistemological debates create law vis-à-vis how law re-creates knowledge ---- this discussion reveals the manner in which drones become a prosthetic between the human and non-human, analyzing the complex nature behind the drone system, operator, and victims

CHANDLER 2012 - Ph.D. Candidate, University of California, Berkeley (Chandler, Katherine, “5,000 FEET IS THE BEST: RE-VIEWING THE POLITICS OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS”)

**ACRONYM NOTE: \*\*\*UAS = Unmanned Aerial Systems\*\*\***

Operators far from the battlefield in Afghanistan used a satellite data- link to remotely fly and control the MQ-1 Predator, which struck the targets in an isolated mountain location. as a result of difficult weather conditions and other issues of accessibility, United States soldiers did not arrive to survey the aftermath of the drone strike until several days after the attack. in Senate testimony, army Gen. tommy Franks, commander of United States forces in afghanistan, commented, “We know we have [killed] some bad guys, but we just don’t know who they are yet” (in Sisk, 2002: 20). news reports described how dna samples from the site would be used to determine if bin laden had been killed, noting that soldiers on the scene “[p]icked up communications gear, weapons, docu- ments and the remains of people killed in the strike, any of which might help determine who those people were” (Shanker & risen, 2002:12). Yet, while the military team sought genetic proof of the MQ-1 Predator’s success, another account emerged. daraz Khan, a villager from lalazha about ten miles from the attack site, was nicknamed “tall Man.” On 4 February 2002, the date of the MQ-1 Predator strike, he and two other villagers, Munir ahmed and Jehangir Khan, went to collect scrap metal, sold for fifty cents a camel load across the border in Pakistan. Former battlegrounds, like the site near Zawar Khili where they went, contained metal remnants from the Soviet invasion and more recent fighting between the americans and the taliban (Singer, 2009: 397). While President George Bush announced he was “fully satisfied” that members of al-Qaeda were killed by the strike (Scarborough, 2002: a01), Gurbuz tribal elders from the village insisted the men who were killed collecting scrap metal were not al-Qaeda. Khan’s sixteen-year-old niece protested, “Why did you americans kill daraz? We have nothing, nothing, and you have taken from us our daraz” (in herold, 2003). the so-called success associated with the 4 February 2002 attack faded from headlines and, like thousands of other afghan civilians, daraz Khan, Munir ahmed, and Jehangir Khan became what the United States Military terms “collateral damage,” forgotten deaths of local people killed in a battlefield beyond their control. eight months later, on 5 november 2002, a MQ-1 Predator killed al-Qaeda operative abu ali al- harithi in Yemen, along with five men in a vehicle with him. this attack is now recorded by the Pentagon as the MQ-1 Predator’s first successful targeted strike in the Global War on terror (Zaloga, 2008: 35). ten years and hundreds of UaS missile strikes later, i return to the 4 February 2002 MQ-1 Predator attack because the tragedy it foregrounds persists. the account asks one to question who is taken as an enemy and how this is framed through the circuit of intelligence information and lethality that is the basis of the MQ-1 Predator. a man’s height and use of a tradi- tional garment allowed for three men’s deaths, while american leaders’ conviction that they killed a bad guy silenced the voices of local tribal leaders and victims’ relatives. Officials had complete confidence in imag- es captured by a camera on a remotely controlled drone, flying over the region at 7000 feet in the air. Side-by-side, dna testing and the MQ-1 Predator were poised as conquerors of the mountainous areas of south- ern afghanistan, littered with the metal from the history of war in the region. Yet, even while the attack revealed the limits of these technolo- gies and by extension, what United States officials could claim to know, it nonetheless served to promote UaS. donald rumsfeld’s testimony points to the powerful equation of intelligence and targeting enabled by the MQ-1 Predator. notably, in this formulation, the question of whether the intelligence obtained through the system was accurate or the men’s deaths were just is not raised. In the first part of this essay, I examine the knowledge politics of Uas, drawing on frameworks from post-colonial studies, bio-politics and sci- ence and technology studies. These approaches offer insight into the circuit of intelligence and targeting enabled by the MQ-1 Predator, com- plicating the connection between the two terms. in the second part of the essay, i turn to 5,000 Feet is the Best (2011), a video installation about a UaS pilot by Omer Fast from which this piece takes its title. the figures the video screens cannot be framed as predictable images or through simple equations; rather, the video is fraught with impossibility and error. through this work, I argue that by attending to the failures of UAS, i.e. what cannot be seen or sensed, possibilities for transformation may be opened up. I ask how impossibility, failure, and unpredictability elide the equation of knowledge and dominance, and examine these interstices. Intelligent targeting: Knowledge politics of Unmanned Aerial Systems Potentials found in intercultural dynamics, many discussed in this volume, open possibilities for rich and productive forms of exchange by intertwining multiple, varying groups of people. However, these relations operate alongside cultural encounters that challenge such possibilities. Edward Said’s Orientalism (1979) emphasizes how knowledge of others has been systematically linked to colonial and post-colonial relations, prioritizing Western dominance and control. More recently, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work (2006) by Rey Chow examines knowledge production and worldwide targeting in the aftermath of World War II. She argues that the development of area Studies, employing social scientists and linguists to study different world regions, was linked to an array of Cold War projects aiming for systematic world control, most notably, American nuclear missile pro- grams (Chow, 2006: 12-15). Chow’s insights provide an apt framework for thinking about the cultural encounter enacted by the MQ-1 Predator, which both collects intelligence and targets. Based on unmanned vehicles developed for reconnaissance during the Cold War, MQ-1 Predators provide real-time, continuous video and infrared imagery of the areas where they are flown. Often, they are used in combination with surveillance that captures mobile or satellite phone communications. Most MQ-1 Predators are flown from bases in the United States, where the operator monitors the system through information relayed on a computer screen and manipulates the UaS through satellite. armed with hellfire missiles and a laser designator, MQ-1 Predator operators can laser pinpoint a target to which a missile is directed. Soldiers on the ground can also use laser pointers to guide missile attacks (Singer, 2009: 34-37). the precision and success that has been attributed to the MQ-1 Predator (department of defense, 2005; drew, 2009: a1+) relies on the connection between ongoing, real-time collection of intelligence information and being able to use the laser sys- tem to target. Significantly, the tragedy of misinformation also becomes apparent in this circuit. While UAS are promoted by the United States Military as an all-powerful seeing eye, they are simultaneously limited, relying primarily on images and intercepted communication. though the United States Military and Cia operators are technologically extended through UAS, they are circumscribed in their modes of seeing and listening. These modes of interaction, watching and eavesdropping, not only diminish possible relations to the targeted other, they also give form to a “we” contradistinguished from the target. This movement from others to operators suggests how such cultural encounters are enmeshed with knowledge politics. to explore this fur- ther, i turn to the concept of bio-power. in Security, Territory, Population (2009), Michel Foucault defines bio-power as “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became object of a political strategy, a general strategy of power ...” (Foucault, 2009: 1). this understanding maps onto contemporary forms of power enabled by UaS. Foucault claims techniques of surveying, analysis, and reflection employed during the modern period came to define humans both biologically and as a surface for calculated and reflected governance. notably a particular conception of the human emerges through these techniques, one that reflects not only on those surveyed but also the surveyors (Foucault, 2009: 71-80). this complicates the strategic circuit of intelligence and targeting, indicating how it is not just enemy targets that are impacted by the system but also the humans who develop and use UaS. Below, I examine the human and nonhuman mechanisms and procedures the MQ-1 Predator mobilizes, indicat- ing how technological strategies are layered into bio-power in its most recent iterations and how this leads to particular formulations of who is human. MQ-1 Predators both fly lower to the ground and slower than a piloted plane could and some models can operate continuously for up to 22 hours, more than double the length of time a human pilot could fly (drew, 2009: a1+). these aspects of the UaS highlight how the system is more-than-human and can enact previously impossible strategies through its technologies. UAS are potent reminders of the ways humans extend themselves through technologies and the consequences of this. Yet, that the system is unmanned is a misnomer; there are always humans linked to them. a ground crew, located at an air base near to where the UaS is deployed, oversees the aircraft’s take-off and landing. Once the UaS is in the air, operations are taken over by pilots and sensor operators based in control trailers in the United States. data and images transmitted through UaS can be displayed on computer screens not only in the control trailer, but also in the battlefield, at the Pentagon and in the White house, while military orders are typically relayed back to operators through chat boxes (Singer, 2009: 35, 337). So, while UAS are designated as unmanned, at the same time, they are a prosthesis that defines the context of the American solder and the commands he or she is given, opposing them to others, who are targets outside the system. Political ecologies: UAS between Nevada and Waziristan Unmanned aerial Systems incorporate complex relations between humans and nonhumans. the previous discussion showed how UaS are deployed against others, distinguishing populations through technologies of bio-power. Science and technology studies (StS) contribute to this analysis by offering ways to re-think how humans act alongside compli- cated physical, technical and biological processes. In States of Knowledge (2004), StS theorist Sheila Jasanoff proposes the concept of co-production to consider the states produced through interactions between humans and nonhumans. She writes, “Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life” (Jasanoff, 2004: 2). the twinning of materiality and knowledge captures how UaS gives form to both the United States and its soldiers, while the system is simultaneously formed by them. Jasanoff examines, “[h]ow knowledge-making is incorporated into practices of state-making, or of governance more broadly, and, in reverse, how practices of governance influence the making and use of knowledge” (Jasanoff, 2004: 3). At the same time, Jasanoff writes that the term plays on the multiple layers of the word ‘state’, which refers not just to a governed body, but also to various organizational, material and embodied forms (ibid). UaS are a technology deployed by the United States to col- lect intelligence and enact its politics. Yet, co-production between the technology and state not only occurs at a national level, rather, UaS technologies have multiple aspects co-produced between physical geographies, technical infrastructure, government officials, industry representatives, media spokespeople, and counter-movements. developed as a reaction to technological determinism, StS emphasizes the multiple and varying technical and material relations that connect humans and nonhumans (Bijker, 2006). in this way, i want to highlight how techniques of bio-power enacted by UaS are not pre-given; rather, they are continuously co-produced through shifting relations between humans and nonhumans. in Cosmopolitics (2010), isabelle Stengers elaborates the concept of political ecology to consider these intercon- nections. to make something intelligible, she argues, is never merely a matter of representing reality. it is also a practice of giving value. She writes, “ecology is, then, the science of multiplicities, disparate causali- ties, and unintentional creations of meaning” (Stengers, 2010: 34). i use the plural, political ecologies, in this account to emphasize how UaS variously move between and beyond military, economic, political, and sci- entific terrains. While i am wary of how UaS are deployed by the United States, i also want to show how they do not align with a single field of power. Below, i suggest how UaS both link and divide two geographi- cally distinct regions and analyze the multiple relations co-produced by these interconnections and disjuncture. in control trailers at Creech air Force Base in indian Springs nevada, UaS operators fly MQ-1 Predators in war zones and beyond. the base is located at the site of a World War ii auxiliary air field, adjacent to the nevada nuclear test Site, about forty-five minutes northwest of las vegas (United States air Force, 2012). the UaS are manufactured by General atomics, a private defense contracting company in San diego, California, founded in 1955. as the name suggests, the com- pany began by developing weaponry for nuclear missiles and its UaS programs emerged from its guided weapons projects and early recon- naissance drones (General atomics and affiliated Companies, 2012). drones, as they were called during the Cold War, were deployed for various missions, serving as practice targets, measuring the effects of atomic tests and to collect still images with film cameras (Zaloga, 2008). the MQ-1 Predator was first fielded in 1995 for surveillance during the Bosnia War (defense airborne reconnaissance Office, 1996). in 2001, the system was armed with missiles and by October 2004, after its widespread use during the iraq invasion, the MQ-1 Predator reached 100,000 flight hours (department of defense, 2005). in 2012, the department of defense announced thirty-one percent of all aerial systems in the military were now designated as unmanned, five times more than in 2005 (ackerman & Shachtman, 2012). UaS industry advocates promote a growing market for unmanned systems and analysts argue that robotics will become increasingly important for the United States Military in the 21st century (Singer, 2009). UaS were significant in the american occupation of iraq and continue to play an important role in afghanistan. as a weapon, the MQ-1 Predator has also been used outside of declared war zones, including Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. investigations by the United nations and amnesty international have raised significant legal concerns about the use of UaS in targeted killings outside war zones, calling them extrajudicial executions (horton, 2010; reuters, 2002: a21). Of these locations, Pakistan has had the most UaS strikes. as of February 15, 2012, the United States had carried out 314 reported drone attacks in Pakistan, the majority in the northern Waziristan region, along the border with afghanistan. Starting in 2004 and growing substantially in scope beginning 2007, the strikes have killed between 1,741 and 2,712 people. the large discrepancy in these numbers indicates the difficulty of obtaining information about the attacks. While the United States does not officially acknowledge the UaS strikes in Pakistan, they have, at the same time, highlighted the program’s success. Officials maintain civilian deaths account for fewer than 20% of the total killed and as few as 5% of the deaths in 2010-2012 (new america Foundation, 2012). these reports differ significantly from those of the Pakistani government, Pakistani press and reports by independent observers, which claim as many as 90% of those killed by the strikes are civilians (rogers, 2010). Waziristan is known as a Federally administered tribal area in Pakistan and policies that guide the region’s governance emerge from the Frontier Crimes regulation established by the British raj in 1901. Part of the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the area was of strategic importance during the afghanistan War against the Soviets during the 1980s. Constitutionally, the area is not bounded to decisions made by Parliament, and the President of Pakistan exercises considerable, direct control over the region. access is limited (rakisits, 2008). nonetheless, furor caused by the drone attacks has not been contained. reports in 2011 describe thousands protesting against these strikes and they are an increasingly potent political issue for Pakistan and the United States (al Jazeera, 2011). While american soldiers watch the region, locals have become wary of the ubiquitous presence of the drone. the MQ-1 Predator is made with an engine akin to those used in snowmobiles. Similarly, the vehicle has an unmistakable hum, which can be heard when it flies closer to the ground (american Forces information Service, 2011). the ubiquitous buzzing sound of the drone, flying overhead, often, in groups of four or five, marks the air system in Waziristan. the hum is a persistent reminder that “they” might strike, at any time. Bangana, a Pashto onamonapia, variously translated as meaning a thunderclap or wasp, is used by locals to describe the UaS (rogers, 2010: 20). The fragmentary scenes above suggest a series of incompatible, yet, deeply interconnected frames. linguistic differences, found in the space between UaS, drone and bangana, gesture to technological, economic, political, and social patterns that give rise to these two unequal, yet, linked ecologies. Operating from control trailers in the nevada desert, soldiers watch and listen through a drone system, which emerged from military-industrial relations that coalesced during the Cold War. Their attacks are cloaked in a vocabulary of protection against terrorists. Americans are invited to see the weapons systems and the soldiers who operate them as justified, mimicking logics developed during the Cold War. Yet, the surveillance network and extrajudicial attacks enabled by UaS largely failed to control the his- torically contested border regions between Pakistan and afghanistan. Rather, the hum of the system produces critique, discontent, and widespread outcry. as a number of analysts have suggested, drones may work to undermine american power (Bishara, 2009; horton, 2010; Swift, 2011). I am deeply concerned about the legal and political consequences that are a result of the United States UaS attacks and support continued efforts to question drone strikes through these means. However, the final part of my paper turns to a video artwork to examine the questions raised by drones. I use this onscreen account to think about the critical work that can be done visually and affectively to address UaS. The images transmitted through UaS are described by the United States Military as intelligence. Yet, the above political ecologies suggest this imagery should instead be viewed as conveying values, enabling the United States to systematically order attacks of targeted groups in certain geographical regions. Both extending from and responding to the political ecologies described above, my analysis of 5,000 Feet is the Best does not offer a simple answer to UaS lethality. Instead, I highlight the role disjuncture, impossibility, and failure to suggest that these gaps open multiple spaces to re-view and, simultaneously, to reconsider and re-imagine the use of UaS. 5,000 Feet is the Best Omer Fast’s video, 5,000 Feet is the Best (2011), provides a subtle and insightful critique of the United States MQ-1 Predator program. i use this piece to elaborate on tensions developed in the previous sections. intertwining what is known and unknown, the concepts of fact, fic- tion, success, failure, imagery, and communication are all problematized through the video. in this way, Fast indicates the challenge of drones might be countered by attending to their multiple impacts, thus, shifting the singular equation of knowledge and power they unsuccessfully enact. the video is drawn from an account given by a MQ-1 Predator operator with post-traumatic stress disorder (PtSd). Yet, this is not immediately apparent and, rather, appears to be a series of staged inter- views between two characters, one who portrays a drone pilot and the other who acts the role of a journalist. the scene of their interview is a non-descript, yet, vividly filmed hotel room. their encounter is repeated three times. Between each repetition, the MQ-1 Predator operator tells a part of his story. his account, voice and affect contrast with the actor’s performance. the duplicity between the operator and the actor is significant, signaling the difficulty of separating the individual from the roles he or she is expected to perform, while at the same time, highlighting the distinction. each interview begins with the journalist asking, “everything okay?” after the pilot comes into the room and lies down on the bed. the pilot replies, “Yeah, i’m okay.” in a painful moment between them, the pilot tells the journalist, “i didn’t realize you’d be filming.” the journalist tells him, “We can stop, if you are uncomfortable.” “Yeah, right,” says the pilot. he takes some pills, asking the journalist if they can hurry up because he has a doctor’s appointment. the journalist asks him, “What’s the difference between you and a real pilot?” “no difference,” the pilot replies. in each repetition, the explanation of why there is no distinction leads to a different vignette, apparently unrelated to his role as a UaS pilot. Filmed in neutral shots, the drone pilot first narrates a story about a young man obsessed with trains who successfully takes on the identity of a train conductor for a day. at the end of the day, he is caught by the police breaking into his own home because he left his keys in the real conductor’s locker. the journalist asks what the story has to do with being a drone pilot. he is told, “the moral of the story is [...] you keep your work life and your domestic life separated.” “You’re not serious,” replies the journalist. Yet, the vignette is also about race. a black man is portrayed the role of the conductor until the journalist asks, “Why did the man have to be black?” the pilot replies, “i didn’t say he was black. Who said anything about color?” the image shifts to a white man and the pilot explains, “this has nothing to do with race.” after the interviewee finishes the vignette, admonishing the journalist to “ask him a better question,” he leaves the hotel room and seems to catch sight of himself as he lingers in the hallway. the image then cuts to the account given by the MQ-1 Predator operator. the first time the viewer sees him, his face is blurred and the only distinguishable fea- ture is his eyes. his narrative then provides the voice-over for a series of aerial shots. these include a suburban neighborhood with a boy biking through the streets, a new england village, recognizable because of the white church steeple in the center of the shot, and a nighttime view of las vegas, lit up with flashing colors and lights. the MQ-1 Predator operator says, “i guess Predator is similar to playing a video game– but playing the same video game for four years straight on the same level.” as the images slowly move below the viewer, he recalls, “One time, i just watched a house for a month straight, for eleven hours a day.” But then, there were also moments of stress. “there are some horrible sides to working Predator. You see a lot of death [...] doing this, you had to think there is so much loss of life that is a direct result of me.” these questions of race and death haunt the final vignette. the pilot tells how “Mom, dad, Johnny, and little Zoe are going on a trip.” a white, american family is pictured packing their things into a station wagon in front of their suburban house. they leave the city, passing through a military check-point as they drive into the country side. On a lonely dirt road, they see a group of men in the distance and stop the car. the men are planting an improvised explosive device. the pilot narrates, “One of the men is younger, almost a teenager, and he wears a traditional head dress.” the image cuts to a white male, wearing a t-shirt and baseball cap. the narration continues, “the other two are older. they’re dressed in clothes more typical to tribes from the south.” these two men are wearing flannel shirts and ballcaps. One man raises his weapon as he indicates that the vehicle should pass by. the car drives slowly by the men. the viewer is told, “the crisis is averted,” and the three men exchange smiles with the family. in a close-up, the driver squeezes his wife’s hand. at that moment, a hellfire missile strikes, “almost vaporizing the men on impact,” and the family emerges from the car like ghosts. re-viewing the MQ-1 Predator’s strike with a white american fam- ily in its target highlights cultural assumptions relayed through UaS’ imagery. notably, the hellfire missile attack screened by Fast enacts key elements of the drone strike that i described at the beginning of this paper. even while the drone pilot maintains “who said anything about race,” markers like skin color, dress, and age are all factors used to visu- ally target certain humans. 5,000 Feet is the Best shows how the circuit of intelligence and targeting enabled by UaS takes the lives of people who are identified as others, turning the assumptions made about the tribal peoples of afghanistan and Pakistan onto americans. however, 5,000 Feet is the Best unsettles this reversal by not only examining who is targeted, but also who targets. they are not separate figures, rather, they are linked. instead of enacting a position of dominance, in Fast’s video, the MQ-1 Predator operator is figured through the condition of PTSD. intertwining these two layers, the veneer of the MQ-1 Predator’s success reveals a mode of relation that is deeply flawed, not unlike the impossible dialogue between the pilot and the journalist. Looking at UaS technology as a dense web of connected political ecologies reveals its failures, demanding a reconsideration of how humans and non-humans through UaS shape and give shape to social forms, at once, personal, political, and intercultural.

#### Our aff is an attempt to recognize the way that drones operate as a product of coloniality, an alternative which attempts to know the world through identity can never be accurate why it is we bomb light-skinned, brown citizens in Yemen but don’t bomb in dark-skinned so-called terrorists in Mali

#### The drones have changed what it means to produce knowledge ---- it demonstrates that the distinction between the body and technology are about to disappear. Absent a more global, post-colonial analysis into the drone system, any project to resuscitate politics will fail. If it’s true that debate constellates our political subjectivity, then we need to better understand and challenge the system that produces that subjectivity in the first place. The prosthetic of drones have bracketed off geographical spaces, which has enabled the extermination of both indigenous Americans and the global periphery---- identity has become flattened to streams of information understood only through signatures and patterns of life, which has changed the game of violence as we know it

PUGLIESE 2013 – Native American Scholar, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University (Pugliese, Joseph. State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones. Routledge, 2013)

The categories of law and technology would seem to be at once non- interchangeable and conceptually distinct. In reductive terms, law can be said simply to act instrumentally by deploying technology to enforce its rules. In this chapter, I problematize this dualistic understanding by theorizing the relation of law and technology as indissociably prosthetic. My theorization of law as prosthetic will be situated in the context of the United States’ use of Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UACVs) or drones in the pursuit and extermination of so- called ‘insurgents’ and ‘terror suspects.’ Theorizing law as prosthetic – that is, as inextricably entwined with technology from its originary enunciation through the technology of language – enables the disclosure of complex dynamics of power, disavowal and violence. Taking my cue from the US doctrine that ‘the war goes where the combatant goes,’ the focus of this chapter will be on examining the relation of law to lethal unmanned aerial combat technologies that conduct war and killing- at-a- distance. I examine this relation in the context of two seemingly opposed fi gures: the parenthetical and the prosthetic. The parenthetical relation of law to technology is premised, I argue, on a topical hiatus that disassociates the executioner who manipulates the killing technology of the drone from the facticity of the resultant execution. In this scenario, law is conceived of in the most radically instrumental of understandings: it enables and legitimates the execution while simultaneously suspending the connection between the doer and the deed. The prosthetic relation of law to technology is, conversely, premised on the indissociable articulation between technology (understood in both the hard- and software senses) and its seeming opposite: the biological human subject. Through a series of instrumental mediations, the biological human actor becomes coextensive with the drone that she or he pilots from the remote ground control station. My analysis of the operations of the prosthetics of law will be situated in the context of the US’s drone wars. These drone wars are shadow wars that unfold both under and beyond the laws of war. As I discussed in my Introduction, the US administration contends that these drone wars conform to the rubric of laws of war, even as these same shadow wars generate geopolitical sites of extra- judicial violence. Within this complex and contradictory configuration of state violence, drones emerge as the prosthetics of US empire: they extend the imperial power of the state through prosthetic weaponry predicated on violent asymmetries of power. These violent asymmetries of power pivot on an invulnerable/vulnerable axis: while US military personnel can conduct their prostheticized campaigns of militarized violence from the safety of their civil home-sites, the citizens of the countries that are targeted by drone strikes are exposed to a violence that works to obliterate the very difference between civil and military; between civilian and terrorist/soldier. Drones The US military deploys two types of drones in the conduct of its war in Afghanistan: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are used for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes, and UACVs are equipped with missiles that can destroy designated targets. The use of UAVs can be traced back to the First World War. It was during the period of the Vietnam War, however, that they began to be deployed in an intensive manner for purposes of surveillance and reconnaissance. The contemporary development of unmanned aerial vehicles was enabled under Section 845 of Public Law 103–160, Section 845; this law ‘gave DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] broad authority to carry out prototype projects that are directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems.’ 1 The deployment of drones by the CIA in the hunt for suspect targets commenced in September 2000 with reconnaissance fl ights over Afghanistan. The arming of unmanned aerial vehicles with missiles designed to liquidate designated targets only occurred in the context of the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US. On 3 November 2002, a Predator drone equipped with two Hellfi re missiles destroyed a car allegedly carrying a senior al-Qaeda leader in the Marib desert of Yemen. 2 This attack enunciated a new paradigm in the conduct of robotic aerial warfare as it effectively marked the possibility of killing- at-a- distance without ever putting the human subject controlling the plane at risk. Predator drones are unmanned planes equipped with sensors, cameras and radar that can identify targets through smoke, fog, haze and clouds. They are also equipped with laser- guidance technology and Hellfi re missiles; the laser designator in the nose of the plane locks on to a target and guides the trajectory of the missile once it has been fi red. The drones are usually launched from a military base close to the theatre of war but they can actually be controlled from a ground control station thousands of miles away. Many of the drones deployed in the war in Afghanistan are controlled from air force bases such as Creech or Nellis, located over 7,000 miles away in Nevada. From their ground control stations, drones are controlled by a pilot, two sensor operators and screeners – personnel with video analysis expertise. The pilot navigates the plane while the two sensor operators control the plane’s cameras and sensors, fi ring the drone’s missiles when it locks on to a target. Schematically, the drone’s communication system resembles a triangulated structure. The pilot and sensor operators transmit their control signals from their ground control station up to a satellite in space that, in turn, amplifi es and transmits these signals down to the drone and vice- versa. The violent dimensions of this robotic killing technology are underscored by the Predator drone crew’s mission statement, as succinctly articulated by Colonel Eric Mathewson, Predator drone squadron commander: ‘Most mission statements are long, complicated and italicized. Mine was three words: “Kill [Expletive] Heads.” ’ 3 Predator drone crews have emblazoned this mission statement – ‘KFH’ – on their unit letterhead. Parenthetical technologies of laws of war In her profound meditation on political economies of violence, Hannah Arendt writes that extreme forms of violence are ‘never possible without instruments.’ 4 ‘Violence,’ Arendt underscores, ‘is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justifi cation through the end it pursues.’ 5 In other words, violence, in its most murderous and instrumentalized forms, cannot be exercised without technology. The drone exemplifies the instrumentalization of violence and laws of war through a complex process of parenthetical disassociation. This process of parenthetical disassociation is predicated on suspending lines of causal connection between an ensemble of technologies and their human agents. It effectively suspends, circumscribes and holds parenthetically in abeyance the relation between executioner and victim; cause and effect. Jeff MacGregor, in his meditation on the transmutation of life into an instrumentalized video game, writes: ‘erase the pain given and taken, reduce the grunt and the struggle to the push of a button . . . and the game, the war, is no more than a fast- twitch exercise – a battle fought without personal cost. It is cause without effect, a victory only for technology and opposable thumbs.’ 6 The armed drone exemplifies the instrumentalization of violence and the laws of war through a complex process of parenthetical disassociation. This process of parenthetical disassociation is predicated on suspending lines of causal connection between an ensemble of technologies and their human agents. In the first instance, the drones, in the execution of their targets, can be said to be blind- seeing technologies of death: as inanimate objects, they cannot ‘see’ what they execute; rather, they execute what must be seen for them by their sensor operators. A rift opens up in this schema between the blind executor and the human- seeing agent that is inscribed with both spatial and temporal dimensions. This causal disconnect between the doer and deed is, in fact, something that Friedrich Nietzsche meditated on in the context of his critical analysis of what he termed the ‘seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason that are petrifi ed in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a “subject.” ’ 7 Nietzsche draws attention, in his critique, to the network of discursive relations – juridical, linguistic and philosophical – that are constitutive in the creation of what Foucault terms the ‘subject effect’ and its relation to deeds, actions and events: there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a function added to the deed – the deed is everything. The popular mind in fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning fl ash, it is the deed of a deed; it posits the same event fi rst as cause and then a second time as its effect. Scientists do no better when they say ‘force moves,’ ‘force causes,’ and the like – all its coolness, its freedom from emotion notwithstanding, our entire science still lies under the misleading infl uence of language and has not disposed of that little changeling, the ‘subject.’ 8 The parenthetical logic of drone killings, and its structural disassociation between the doer and the deed, is perfectly captured in this Nietzschean critique: the doer, in this scenario, is functionally coextensive with the deed and only becomes separated by the ‘seduction of language’ and its subject–predicate structure. The ‘doubling’ of the deed and the production of the doer/deed effect are what enable the conceptual partitioning of the technology from the human subject. Couched in Nietzschean terms, one can say that the drone does the killing and that the sensor operator who presses the ‘fi re’ button is merely a type of afterthought that can only be retrospectively constituted as separate from the deed. As I will argue presently, following Nietzsche’s problematization of the dualistic doer- deed formula, the viewing of the human subject/technology nexus in prosthetic terms effectively works to interrogate the parenthetical logic that inscribes the conceptual apparatus of drone technologies. The killing- at-a- distance operations of the drone ensemble of technology and human agents work to articulate a spatial hiatus and parenthetical disconnect between this place – that is, the ground control station (GCS) located in, for example, Nevada – and that place – the to- kill target located in Afghanistan. Working in tandem with this spatial rift is a temporal disconnect generated by satellite technology. Although the killing of the designated target is supposedly conducted in terms of what the military literature terms ‘real time,’ the mediating effects of satellite and imaging technologies on ‘live’ and ‘real time’ signify that, in effect, there can only ever be ‘an allegation of “live” ’ and of ‘real time.’ Discussing the metaphysics of presence in the contemporary confi guration of ‘tele- technomediatic modernity’ and its celebration of such things as ‘live’ satellite- televisual transmissions, Derrida pointedly remarks that ‘we should never forget that this “live” is not an absolute live, but only a live effect [ un effect de direct ], an allegation of “live.” ’ 9 It is an allegation of live that animates the operation of drones, as ‘to allege’ signifi es, in legal terms, ‘to assert without proof’ and, simultaneously, to ‘cite, quote.’ 10 In other words, the very act of ‘live’ and ‘real time’ drone executions must undergo a series of tele- techno mediations that structurally ensure that the ‘absolutely real present is already a memory’: ‘there is no purely real time because temporalization itself is structured by a play of retention or of protention and, consequently, of traces . . . The real time effect is itself a particular effect of “différance.” ’ 11 In other words, there opens up here a temporal rift between the ‘now’ – a moment of ‘retention’ as experienced, for example, at Creech Ground Control Station, Nevada – and the ‘then’ – the relayed moment of protention that unfolds in Afghanistan as already a ‘memory’ for those located at the GCS in Nevada. This temporal rift is, in effect, acknowledged by the military’s use of the term ‘latency’ in order to identify the micro delay that inscribes the command sent by the remote pilot to the airborne drone and its consequent response. The structure of this tele- techno mediation can be envisioned as triangulated: the human operators at their ground stations are interlinked to the drone on the other side of the globe by the interposition of the satellite in space. This triangulated structure of interlinked communication graphically evidences the mediations and micro- diachronic hiatuses that transmute the ‘live’ image into a latent ‘memory’; into a retrospective artefact of ‘real time.’ The micro- diachronic hiatuses that effectively turn the ‘live’ into ‘memory’ are marked, in passing, by former President George W. Bush’s celebratory speech on UACVs: ‘Innovative doctrine and high- tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional confl ict. Our commanders are gaining a real- time picture of the entire battlefi eld, and are able to get targeting information from sensor to shooter almost immediately.’ 12 The qualifi er ‘almost immediately’ succinctly names the ‘latency’ effect discussed above, while also underscoring the micro- rift between ‘live’ and ‘real time’ and their tele- techno mediation into retrospectively constructed spatio- temporal visual artefacts. In the techno- military literature on drone technologies, everything is driven on ultimately ‘decreasing the time between sensor and shooter’ and thereby ‘shortening the “kill chain.” ’ 13 The military term ‘kill chain’ diagrammatically underscores the impossibility of an absolute synchronicity that, because of the unavoidable tele- techno mediations, is not always already marked by the micro- hiatus that separates yet conjoins one link from another in the ‘kill chain.’ The prosthetic status of this triangulated structure can be elaborated in the context of the multiple dimensions it embodies: human- machine-human, life- technology-death and agent- machine-victim. As I will discuss in some detail below, this triadic structure is topologically conjoined by a series of prosthetic grafts that suture one seemingly autonomous entity to its absolute other. The prosthetic relations that I have been mapping here can be situated within Michel Serres’ theorization of topology ‘as the science of nearness and rifts.’ 14 Serres names this topology the ‘fold’ – as that topological fi guration of space- time that is productive of simultaneous rifts and nearness. Gilles Deleuze effectively elaborates on the complex logic operative in the topology of the fold by describing the ‘duplicity of the fold’ in terms of ‘a tension by which each fi eld is pulled into the other.’ 15 The topology of the fold at once captures the complex spatio- temporal effects generated by drone technologies and the contradictory tensions that inscribe their fi eld of operations by marking the indissociable relation between seemingly antithetical categories. Viewed in this context, the geometry of the triangulated structure that I have drawn upon in order to describe the drone ensemble can be seen to offer only a static image of what is in actuality a dynamic process of topological relations between rifts and nearness; the other and the same; human and technology. As I discuss below, these topological relations are fundamentally negotiated or mediated through the figure of the prosthetic. What results from the process of tele- techno mediations that I have been mapping, regardless of ‘real time’ and ‘live’ claims, is what Derrida terms ‘traces.’ This is not to reduce the murderous consequences of the drone attacks to insubstantial remains; rather, it is to underscore the artefactual status of the images/ traces of the killings that the GCS operators work with and that structurally distance and disassociate them from the victims of their actions. Critically, it is the combined effect of the parenthetical suspension of the ‘real’ and the ‘live’ produced by this tele- techno necropolitical economy of war that transmutes killing into the stuff of video games and that establishes a type of causal disconnect, and consequent disavowal, of the human operators’ relation to the killing that transpires on the ground in ‘remote’ Afghanistan or Pakistan. The following remarks by Predator drone operators located at a GCS in Nevada exemplify this spatio- temporal disconnect: ‘It’s antiseptic. It’s not as potent an emotion as being on the battlefi eld’; ‘It’s like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it’s fucking cool’; ‘Most of the time, I get to fi ght the war, and go home and see the wife and kids at night.’ 16 ‘Another talked about fl ying missions in Afghanistan, and then getting home in time to watch reruns of the TV sitcom Friends .’ 17 ‘You have some guy sitting at Nellis [GCS Nevada] and he’s taking his kid to soccer. It’s a strange dichotomy of war.’ 18 This strange dichotomy of war is enabled by a parenthetical logic that brackets off causal relations through a series of tele-techno mediations that, in turn, transmute the ‘real’ into Baudrillardian simulacra. 19 This strange dichotomy of war resonates on yet another level. On the one hand, negotiating the materiality of geography is one of the key predicates of successful warfare; on the other, drone warfare effectively ensures that ‘the limitations of geography are taken out of the war that a soldier goes off to experience.’ 20 For drone soldiers, the experience of geography is at once unbounded and simulated via the ensemble of screen technologies and circumscribed by the very materiality of the civil sites and spaces of their everyday lives. The ensconcing of war operations, and the everyday deployment of lethal drone attacks, within US cities such as Langley, Virginia, gestures to a mutation in the conduct of war. The manner in which drone operators can exterminate human targets during their assigned combat sessions, via their ensemble of tele- mediating technologies and military hardware, and then go home to take the kids to soccer or have a drink at their local bar, works to normalize war as something that is effectively part of the civilian continuum of everyday life practices. This continuum of practices is facilitated by the euphemisms of war: the screen media that display the atomization and incineration of bodies by drone missiles are called by the military ‘Kill TV’; the material violence infl icted on human targets becomes merely ‘kinetic activity,’ as though killing were just another form of gym exercise; and the human targets of drones are reduced, in turn, to yet another abstract kinetic term: ‘dismounts.’ ‘Dismounts’ effectively abstracts the human drone targets of the materiality of their subjecthood: they are objectifi ed and reduced to trackable movement without bodies. The parenthetical logic that underpins the video game dimensions of drone killings helps facilitate the transition from exterminatory combat operations to civilian sites and practices. In the words of an air force colonel of a Predator drone squadron: ‘It teaches you how to compartmentalize it [the reality of war].’ 21 The everyday returns to civilian locations of ‘home’ after a series of technologically mediated killings in another country can be seen to be inscribed by the forces of technological dis/location that drive the operations of drones: ‘The more powerful and violent the technological expropriation, the delocalization,’ Derrida notes, ‘the more powerful, naturally, the recourse to the at- home, the return towards home.’ 22 The violent deterritorialization, delocalization and dissociation that is experienced in the drone ground control stations provokes the reaction: ‘I want to be at home , I want fi nally to be at home, with my own, close to my friends and family.’ 23 Drone operators have remarked on how the trip home from their ground control stations enables them to transition from battlefi eld to civilian modes, with the hour’s drive back to their home giving them ‘that whole amount of time to leave it behind. They get in their bus or car and go into a zone – they say, “For the next hour I’m decompressing, I’m getting re- engaged into what’s it’s like to be a civilian.” ’ 24 This return to a safe home is the privilege and prerogative of the drone- enabled resident- soldier of the Global North. In the target countries of the Global South – Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen – the at-home is open to the anomic violence of drones and the ever- present risk of obliteration of home, friends and family. The militarization of civil space in the drone target countries of the Global South establishes the very impossibility to live the civil – as safe space for the unfolding of quotidian lives. Seemingly banal civil practices such as using a mobile phone (which a drone detects and can use as a tracking device) or of assembling for a community gathering (such as a funeral) place their subjects at risk of being killed. Philip Alston and Hina Shamsi have drawn critical attention to what they term the ‘PlayStation mentality’ that surrounds drone killings. Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fi ghters value the right to life? How will commanders and policymakers keep themselves immune from the deceptively antiseptic nature of drone killings? Will the standards for intelligence- gathering to justify a killing slip? Will the number of acceptable ‘collateral’ civilian deaths increase? 25 The ‘PlayStation mentality’ is, in fact, something the US military is using in its recruitment drives: ‘The military is absolutely capitalizing on it. There’s a game called America’s Army that was developed out of West Point, and it’s been used blatantly as a recruiting tool to draw teenage kids in to make the army look cool and to make it look bloodless . . . it’s a shoot-’em- up game where there’s never any blood.’ 26 The bracketing off that is enabled by the parenthetical logic that governs these screen technologies can be appositely situated within Heideggerian terms. ‘The fundamental event of the modern age,’ writes Heidegger, ‘is the conquest of the world as picture.’ 27 Underscoring this epistemic shift to viewing the world as picture has been the dominance of screen technologies in mediating virtually everything that can be seen in terms of ‘world.’ The parenthetical bracketing off of the world that I have been examining can effectively be understood as a form of ‘enframing’ the world. In his discussion of the term, Heidegger posits the process of enframing as a positive aspect of our relation to technology, as technology, in this understanding, works to reveal the truth of the ‘real.’ I want to resignify this Heideggerian term in order to mark the manner in which screen technologies operate literally to bracket off the ‘real’ and to transmute it into object. Conjoining this resignifi ed understanding of enframing to Heidegger’s meditation on the ‘conquest of the world as picture’ effectively brings into focus the levels of epistemic and physical violence that the militarized use of tele- techno mediative technologies enable. In his theorization of the epistemic shift to viewing the world as picture, Heidegger notes that the process of representation is crucial to the construction of the world as picture. What is particularly relevant to my analysis of the parenthetical logic of screen technologies and the lethality of drones is the manner in which Heidegger’s analysis of the relation between representation and the world as picture underscores the role of objectifying violence: ‘Representing is . . . a laying hold and grasping of’ what it is that is being viewed; in this scopic process, Heidegger emphasizes, ‘assault rules.’ 28 The ‘assault’ on what is being viewed is legitimated by its transmutation into ‘object’: ‘Representing is making- stand-over- against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters . . . That which is . . . has the character of an object.’ 29 This process of objectifi cation of the ‘real’ is undergirded by the play of science and technology: ‘Science sets upon the real. It orders it into place to the end that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as an interacting network.’ 30 The ‘real,’ in the context of drone technologies, is precisely that which ‘exhibits’ itself through the tele- techno mediations of an ‘interacting network’ constituted by pilots/sensor operators, satellite links and drones. The enframing of the world as picture through ‘entrapping representation’ ensures the ‘real becomes secured in its objectness.’ 31 Signature strikes and patterns of life Everything in this Heideggerian exposition can be effectively transposed to illuminate the operations of drone screen technologies in order to entrap and reduce the surveilled human fi gure into an object that can be antiseptically killed from a distance. The antiseptic vision of war that is produced by the parenthetical logic of the use of drone technologies is further enhanced by the clinical language deployed by the drone operators in their identifi cation of suspect targets. The drone’s infrared camera, with its digitally enhanced zoom, enables the sensor operators to detect the heat signature of a human body from signifi cant distances. The term ‘heat signature’ works to reduce the targeted human body to an anonymous heat- emitting entity that merely radiates signs of life. This clinical process of reducing human subjects to purely biological categories of radiant life is further elaborated by the US military’s use of the term ‘pattern of life’: The CIA received secret permission to attack a wide range of targets, including suspected militants whose names are not known, as part of a dramatic expansion of its campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan’s border region. The expanded authority . . . permits the agency to rely on what offi cials describe as ‘pattern of life’ analysis, using evidence collected by surveillance cameras or unmanned aircraft. The information was used to target suspected militants, even when their full identities were not known . . . Previously the CIA was restricted in most cases to killing only individuals whose names were on an approved list . . . some analysts said permitting the CIA to kill people where names were unknown created a serious risk of killing innocent people. 32 The military term ‘pattern of life’ is inscribed by two intertwined systems of scientifi c conceptuality: algorithmic and biological. The human subject detected by drones’ surveillance cameras is, in the first scientific schema, transmuted algorithmically into a patterned sequence of numerals: the digital code of ones and zeros. Converted into digital data coded as ‘pattern of life,’ the targeted human subject is reduced to an anonymous simulacrum that fl ickers across the screen and can be effectively liquidated into a ‘pattern of death’ with the swivel of a joystick. Viewed through the scientifi c gaze of clinical biology, ‘pattern of life’ connects the drone’s scanning technologies to the discourse of an instrumentalist science, its constitutive gaze of objectifying detachment, and its production of exterminatory violence. Patterns of life are what are discovered and analyzed in the petri dish of the laboratory. In this way, the targeted human subjects of Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen are represented as types of bacteria and other low- life organisms that can be exterminated antiseptically. The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center’s chief has boasted that, thanks to their drone automated execution program, ‘We are killing these sons of bitches faster than they can grow them now.’ 33 Analogically, the human subjects targeted as suspect, yet anonymous, ‘patterns of life’ by the drones become equivalent to forms of pathogenic life. The operators of the drones’ exterminatory attacks must, in effect, be seen to conduct a type of scientifi c ethnic cleansing of pathogenic ‘life forms.’ In the words of one of the US military offi cers: ‘Our major role is to sanitize the battlefi eld.’ 34 The Muslim target is here constituted by the intertwining of racism, sexism and speciesism. Muslim women are framed as non- human animal ‘bitches’ that ‘breed’ their Muslim progeny. The wives of terrorists, indeed, have been termed by one US academic as legitimate ‘drone bait’ and their children as ‘terror spawn.’ 35 Civilian women and children are, through the implementation of the biopolitical caesura, reduced to pathogenic life forms that need to be ‘sanitized’ through the exterminatory process of ethnic cleansing. The drones effectively transmute ‘patterns of life’ into shattered ‘patterns of death’: after a drone attack that killed 13 Afghans, a ‘tribesman said the place was littered with body parts and it was diffi cult to recognise the victims. He said that the villagers collected body parts from rubble and put them into sacks for burial.’ 36 Here the identities of the drone targets become unknown even to their friends and relations as they are dismembered beyond recognition. As I will presently discuss, inscribing this clinical discourse on drones is the fi gure of immunization against foreign and pathogenic bodies. As mere patterns of pathogenic life, these targeted human subjects are effectively reduced to what Agamben would term ‘a kind of absolute biopolitical substance’ that can be killed with no concern about the possibility of juridical accountability. 37 Anonymous patterns of life signify in contradistinction to legally named persons: they possess no subjecthood. They exemplify da Silva’s ‘no- bodies’ that can be killed with impunity through the deployment of a type of ‘ontological hygiene’ legislated by US government policy in order to secure the reproduction of the ‘principle of scarcity with respect to agency and personhood.’ Within this Heideggerian tele- techno regime of visuality, the subject of the drone strike is fi gured as mere object- thing. Yet this transmutation of human subject into object- thing is not solely the result of the mediative operations of instrumentalizing technology and its securing of the real in its objectness. Things are more complex. Undergirding this regime of visuality is that dynamic constituted by what da Silva names the ‘self- determined subject’ that occupies the ‘transparent “I” ’ and the killable ‘others of Europe’ situated in ‘affectibility’ – as the condition of being violently subjected to the exercise of power. 39 I want to reaccentuate da Silva’s ‘arsenal of raciality’ with the suffi x of speciesism in order to disclose how the arsenal of racio- speciesism determines the subject/object relations of this regime of visuality. The drone pilots and sensor operators, as subjects of the ‘transparent “I” ’ are nowhere to be seen in this visual schema: they are at once omniscient, transparent and self- determining subjects that secure their ‘universal juridicality,’ and its attendant rights and protections, in relation to the ‘affectable’ animal others of the tautological European- human: Muslim/Arab ‘bitches’ and ‘terror spawn’ that must be ‘sanitized’ through drone strikes. As affectable object- things, these others are governed by what da Silva terms the logics of ‘exclusion’ (from universal juridicality) and ‘obliteration’ (of difference). As object- things excluded from universal juridicality, they can be obliterated ‘without unleashing an ethical crisis.’ 40 Drone killings are conducted under the banner of two rubrics: ‘personality’ strikes and ‘signature’ strikes. Personality strikes target subjects whose identities are known. This type of strike does not guarantee that innocent civilians will not be killed as the Obama administration is offering bounties of $5,000 for information that identifi es ‘terrorists.’ During the Bush era, the offer of bounties resulted in thousands of innocent civilians being framed as suspects; they were consequently captured and imprisoned in places such as Bagram and Guantánamo. Signature strikes target ‘large groups of people whose identities are not known’ but who are seen to display patterns of behavior that render them suspicious. 41 Developed by the CIA as, in their words, ‘a new fl avor of activity’ and a desire to ‘broaden the aperture,’ signature strikes have generated a signifi cant escalation of drone attacks. 42 The lethal results of this ‘broadening of the aperture’ are unambiguously evidenced in the drone killing and maiming of a group of civilians in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. A group of two dozen civilians, many of them Hazaras under persecution by the Taliban, set off in three vehicles from their villages in southern Daikundi province. The group included ‘shopkeepers going for supplies, students returning to school, people seeking medical treatment and families with children off to visit relatives. There were several women and as many as four children younger than 6.’ 43 This group of civilians was marked as displaying suspicious behavior and consequently became the victim of a signature strike that killed twenty-three men and wounded twelve others, ‘including a woman and three children. Elders from the Afghans’ home villages said in interviews that “two boys, Daoud, 3, and Murtaza, 4,” had also been killed.’ 44 A transcript of the radio exchanges between drone pilot, camera operator, mission intelligence coordinator, safety observer and a team of screeners has been declassifi ed. It evidences the errors, arbitrary judgements and wilful misreadings that inscribe the construction of false positive targets identifi ed in signature strikes. As the civilians set off on their fateful journey, the fl ashing of car lights is misconstrued as ‘signalling.’ A drone pilot asks the camera operator if the infrared camera has detected a rifl e in the car. The camera operator replies: ‘Maybe just a warm spot from where he was sitting . . . Can’t really tell right now, but it does look like an object.’ 45 No weapons are ever positively identifi ed and yet the drone crew proceed as if they have been, thereby establishing an offi cial reason to kill. As the civilian convoy is tracked, the drone operators display growing impatience to stage a strike regardless of a concatenation of evidence that suggests the presence of civilian passengers: 03:05 (Pilot): . . . standby one . . . we’re checking. Looks mostly to be military aged males. We have seen approximately two children. Standby. 03:05 (Pilot): Dude the only thing I can see if this isn’t something [expletive deleted] is the locals trying to get away. You know what I mean? 46 Five minutes later, when a child is again identifi ed, the response is: ‘But like I said, 12–13 with a weapon is just as dangerous.’ To which the reply from a sensor operator is: ‘Oh we agree. Yea.’ 47 When one of the screeners again reports the identifi cation of a child, the response from the sensor is: ‘bull sh\*t, where?’ To which the pilot adds: ‘why didn’t he say “possible child?” . . . why are they quick to call kids but not to call (expletive deleted) a rifl e.’ The sensor operator validates this dismissal of the presence of children: ‘I really doubt that children call, man, I really (expletive deleted) hate that.’ 48 As the offi cial investigative report fi nds, despite reports from the screeners, and ‘the Full Motion Video (FMV) from the Predator showing women and children on the objective site,’ the drone operators persist in dismissing the civilian status of the convoy. 49 The drone operators at their video consoles at Creech Air Force Base, 7,000 miles away in Nevada, mention that they have ‘about 8 hours of playtime left’ and it becomes obvious that they are impatient for ‘kinetic action.’ This is also emphasized in the investigative report on the incident: ‘The pervasive theme throughout several interviews with the Predator team, and as seen throughout the internal dialogue was the desire to go kinetic.’ 50 When the Sensor, after an absence, returns, they announce: ‘Sensor is in let the party begin.’ The ‘party’ begins with a drone unleashing Hellfi re missiles and striking two of the vehicles, while two Kioa helicopters that had joined the drone proceed to fi re on the ‘squirters’; the civilians fl eeing the hell that has been unloosed upon them. In the context of this homicidal ‘party,’ the following jocular exchange is made: 04:32 (MC): There’s one guy sitting down? 04:32 (Sensor): What are you playing with? (Talking to individual on ground.) 04:32 (MC): His bone. 51 Kill TV is operative here. The victims of war and the trauma of the wounded amount to little more than a tele- mediated spectacle where the technology of the screen works to reduce the Afghan man to an insentient video game fi gure dallying with his shattered body. In the smouldering post- strike landscape, women are identifi ed: 04:23 (Safety Observer): Are they wearing burqas? 04:23 That’s what it looks like. 04:23 That guy looks like he’s wearing jewelry and stuff like a girl, but he ain’t . . . if he’s a girl, he’s a big one. 52 In the biopolitical schema that violently inscribes this attack, the Afghan children and women are precluded from embodying their demographic identities as either ‘children’ or ‘women.’ Rather, the violence of the biopolitical caesura dispatches men, women and children down the racio- speciesist hierarchy to the status of undifferentiated biological matter: 04:34 (Sensor): So, it looks like those lumps are probably all people. 04:34 (Safety Observer): Yep. 04:34 (MC) I think the most lumps are on the lead vehicle because everybody got . . . the Hellfi re . . . (interrupted by radio). 53 Everything here is reduced to a singularity: the lump , locus of non- human biopolitical substance. This is the raw data generated by drones. The living, the wounded and the dead can be collectively categorized as ‘lumps.’ Here difference fails to signify. Rather, it is precisely what is effaced through the most violent operations of imperial homogenization and tele- techno militarized mastery. This is the terminal point of the speciesist hierarchy of life: the lump. The lump is at once human, animal, vegetable and mineral. In its collapsing and obliteration of difference it situates the resultant (human) object- things under the sign of death: lumps are what remain after a living fi eld has been incinerated by Hellfi re missiles. Operative here is the parenthetical logic of tele- techno mediation that, through the technology of the screen, enframes and objectifi es its human targets into pixelated constellations that amount to nothing more than the insentient fi gures of a militarized video game. As one drone pilot remarks as he locks on his target: ‘The man wasn’t really a human being. He was so far away and only a high- tech image on a computer screen.’ 54 The gaming dimensions of these drone executions are further underscored by the naming of the suspects’ biographies in the drone ‘kill lists’ as ‘baseball cards.’ 55 Nasim, a young mechanic who survived the Uruzgan drone attack, describes the post- strike scene: ‘When I came to, I could see that our vehicles were wrecked and the injured were everywhere . . . I saw someone who was headless and someone else cut in half.’ 56 Another name for a drone signature strike is ‘crowd killing.’ A crowd killing is exactly what has been staged by this drone strike. The images of the drones’ signature strikes document metal fused to fl esh, dismembered bodies and the remains of unintelligible debris. They underscore an implacable order that divides modalities of living and dying according to a racio- speciesist hierarchy that dispenses violence according to its biopolitical divisions and taxonomies: MAMs (military age males who are not necessarily proven to be military personnel), dismounts, squirters and lumps. These are the terminological accretions that overlay and subsume the human targets designated as ‘patterns of life.’ Civilian women, children and men are thereby precluded from inhabiting the potentially life- saving category that they in fact embody. Every excuse is made in the transcribed Uruzgan drone log in order for this category to be suspended. The Afghan civilians consequently live and die under the sign of its violent elision. They are only enabled to embody the category of ‘civilians’ retrospectively ; after they become the victims of militarized violence, the military will term them CIVCAS (civilian casualties): ‘It [the Obama administration] in effect counts all military- age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration offi cials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent .’ 57 This is the prerogative of empire: to kill fi rst and only after, if at all, to bother to fi nd out if those killed were innocent. These are the disposable deaths of empire that fail to f i gure in the US administration’s modest and sanitized body counts, as the identities of the dead often remain unknown: ‘They count the dead,’ says one Obama offi cial, ‘and they’re not really sure who they are.’ 58 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has estimated that in Pakistan alone, between 482 and 832 civilians have been killed, including 175 children. 59 I counterpose these killings of civilians by drones against the offi cial US line: ‘Drones are a major step forward toward much more discriminating uses of violence in war and self- defense – a step forward in humanitarian weapons technology.’ 60 The violent effects of this ‘humanitarian weapons technology’ are brutally evidenced by the drone killing of Tariq Aziz, a 16-year- old Pakistani civilian who became involved in a project titled Transparency Cameras; the project aims to photographically document the results of drone strikes in order to counter the US government’s repeated denials of any civilian casualties in the face of the mounting evidence. On his way home from a gathering in which he agreed to work with Shahzad Akbar, a lawyer who is attempting to prosecute the US for the drone civilian killings, he and his cousin Waheed Khan were killed instantly by a drone strike just a few feet from his aunt’s house. The exterminatory violence that I have just brought into focus cannot be merely reduced to the objectifying and dissociative effects of tele- mediative technologies. Augmenting the objectifying role of screen technologies and speciesist language in facilitating the extermination of drone targets is a larger discursive infrastructure of Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism within the culture of the US military apparatus, its contractual non- state agents and the larger social context. Jeremy Scahill, for example, documents how Blackwater’s ‘leading executives are dedicated to a Christian- supremacist agenda’ in the form of a ‘crusade’ against Islam. 61 In her analysis of Islamophobia post/911, Sherene Razack has characterized the institutional consolidation of this racist formation in terms of a casting out of Muslims from the domains of Western law and politics. 62 In the specifi c context of the US military, I draw attention to a course conducted at the Defense Department’s Joint Forces Staff College, by Army Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A. Dooley titled ‘ “So What Can We Do?” A Counter-Jihad Op Design Model.’ The course stands as an unapologetic and doctrinal validation of Islamophobia. ‘This [US] nation,’ Dooley declares, ‘was founded under a “judeo- christian” ethic of reason and tolerance.’ This ‘ethic,’ however, has now been placed at risk by, amongst other things, deconstruction: The deconstructionist philosophies . . . have given rise to a cultural willingness to accept moral equivalency in all matters. According to deconstructionalism [sic], one person’s meaning (or religion, or ideology) is equal in truth and validity to any other. By extension then, Islam and its ideology/politics of hate/violence are just as legitimate as Christianity, capitalism or representative democracy. Ergo, ‘the West’ can make no philosophical claim to be ‘better’ and have no legitimacy in demanding any compromise from the Islamic community. 63 Dooley proceeds to juxtapose the threat posed by (this parodic account of) ‘deconstructionist philosophies’ with a violent caricature of Islam: In exploring Islam’s own stated doctrine, its own stated laws , and its own stated goals for the world, it is clear that Islam remains an ideology and system of governance that demands the extermination of anyone who does not subscribe to each and every one of its tenets . . . It is therefore time for the United States to make our true intentions clear. This barbaric ideology will no longer be tolerated. Islam must change or we will facilitate its self- destruction. 64 The means that Dooley proposes in order to facilitate Islam’s self- destruction call for unqualifi ed military violence that includes mass destruction of civilian populations: Some actions offered here for consideration here will be seen as not ‘politically correct’ in the eyes of many, both inside and outside the United States . . . This model presumes Geneva Convention IV 1949 standards of armed confl ict and the pursuant UN endorsements of it are now, due to the current common practices of Islamic terrorists, no longer relevant or respected globally. This would leave open the option of once again taking war to a civilian population wherever necessary (the historical precedents of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki being applicable to the Mecca and Medina destruction DP [Decision Points] in Phase III). 65 Casting the apparent shackles of ‘political correctness’ aside, Dooley proposes here nothing less than the genocide of Muslim civilians and the complete destruction of their most holy sites, Mecca and Medina, by calling on the ‘historical precedents’ of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In order to graphically underscore the fact that, under this militarized reading of Islam, even Muslim civilians pose threats that call for systematic extermination, Dooley includes in his PowerPoint presentation a collage of photographs of Muslim children all geared up in military uniforms or, in the context of the Palestinian intifada, in the act of throwing stones. The rubric that frames this collage of Muslim ‘child soldiers’ is ‘Defi ning and Seeking a Partner for Peace: The “Moderate” Muslim.’ In other words, for Dooley ‘moderate’ Muslim is a contradiction in terms and thus even Muslim children are appropriate targets for exterminatory violence. After an internal outcry at the race- hate disseminated by this course, the Pentagon cancelled it and ‘ordered the entire U.S. military to scour its training material to make sure it doesn’t contain similar hateful material.’ Dooley, however, ‘still maintains his position at the Norfolk, Virginia college, pending an investigation’ and, as the reporters who broke this story note: ‘The commanders, lieutenant colonels, captains and colonels who sat in Dooley’s classroom, listening to the infl ammatory material week after week, have now moved into higher- level assignments throughout the US military.’ 66 This course in virulent religio- race hate stands at one end of the discursive continuum of Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism that encompasses the racist practices deployed by a number of US military, medical and intelligence personnel in their respective fi elds (see Chapters 2 , 3 and 4 ) and the ‘everyday racism’ 67 that affects the larger politico- cultural landscape of the US state. Situated within the matrix of US racial imperialism, this Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism undergirds the various militarized interventions in the Middle East. As Steven Salaita notes, these US interventions are justifi ed under the avowed desire to ‘ “civilize” them [Arabs] by introducing the natives to “democracy” ’ while failing to mention ‘the actual motivation for the intervention: the plunder of resources.’ 68 Prosthetics of law If, as I argued above, a parenthetical logic of tele- techno mediations functions to suspend the causal relation between the doer and deed, then in this section of the chapter I want to argue that, in this techno- legal economy of war- at-a- distance, something entirely opposite is simultaneously operating. This something entirely opposite is what I want to term the prosthetics of law . As Kieran Tranter has noted in his rubric for a symposium on law and technology, ‘The predominant theory of law in the orthodox scholarship is instrumental and sovereign. At a fundamental level law is conceived as a process, a machine that can be deployed.’ 69 In proceeding to conceptualize law as a prosthetic, I want to interrogate this instrumentalist view of law as machine that is fundamentally separate from its human agents who, as sovereign subjects, merely deploy it instrumentally in order to achieve their desired goals. A prosthetics of law, on the contrary, is concerned with conceptualizing the human agent as always-already inscribed by the technics of law. If, as Derrida argues, ‘the question of the prosthesis’ is concerned with the ‘phantom member,’ 70 then the drone must be viewed as a type of phantom member grafted through the operations of the laws of war on to the sensor operators located in their remote ground control stations. In deploying the fi gure of prosthetics and its ‘phantom member,’ I am invoking, by defi nition, the category of disability, specifically, of an impaired body that needs to be supplemented by a techno- conceptual ‘crutch,’ that is, a militarized, phallogocentric ‘phantom member.’ I am, in other words, inscribing my analysis within the domain of what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder term ‘narrative prosthesis.’ ‘ Narrative prosthesis ,’ Mitchell and Snyder write, ‘is meant to indicate that disability has been used throughout history as a crutch upon which literary narratives lean for their representational power, disruptive potentiality, and analytical insight.’ 71 Although Mitchell and Snyder focus largely on literary narratives in their examination of narrative prosthesis, their thesis can be productively transposed to other genres and domains of knowledge. Precisely as the fi gure of prosthesis enables, in what follows, the articulation of analytical insights into the complex operations of drones and law, I risk the danger of effacing the materiality of the disabled body by focusing exclusively on the metaphoric or tropological dimensions of prosthesis. In order to counter this risk, I will presently address the material dimensions of prosthesis and disabled bodies in terms of the violent effects of technologies of war. Law as prosthetic works to problematize instrumentalist conceptualizations of law that are predicated on a dichotomy between human agents and technology. Law as prosthetic is predicated on the understanding that law, as technology, is always- already embodied, and that the dichotomy between human subject and technology/ technè is, in effect, untenable. In contradistinction to a conceptualization of the body as a purely natural datum (with technology as its polar opposite), I proceed to conceptualize the body as an entity that can only achieve its cultural intelligibility as ‘body’ because it is always- already inscribed by a series of discursive and technological mediations. As I have discussed elsewhere, I understand the body as indissociably tied to technology and not as something that stands in contradistinction to it. 72 Drawing on the work of Derrida, I refuse the binary: body/technology or natural/synthetic. In his theorization of the relation between body and technology, Derrida articulates the inextricable tie between the natural ( physis ) and the synthetic ( technè ). 73 He emphasizes that this relation ‘is not an opposition; from the very fi rst there is instrumentalization [ dès l’origine il y a de l’instrumentalisation ] . . . a prosthetic strategy of repetition inhabits the very moment of life. Not only, then, is technics not in opposition to life, it also haunts it from the very beginning.’ 74 From the very beginning, then, the body is always-already intextuated and instrumentalized by a series of technologies. At the most elementary level, this process of technical inscription, through the technology of language, is essential in rendering the body culturally intelligible. At yet another level, the body is inscribed from the very beginning (at birth) by a series of laws that proceed to determine its legal identity, its gender, its maternity and paternity, and so on. Law, in other words, is never something that comes after the body; rather, law is always- already inscribed on the body, precisely as technè from the very first. As I discussed in Chapter 5 , this confi guration of body and technology is succinctly articulated in the term somatechnics . The prosthetic inscription of the body must be seen, indeed, to constitute the very conditions of possibility for the conceptual marking of the body as ‘human’: ‘The prosthesis,’ notes Bernard Stiegler, ‘is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the constitution of this body qua “human.” ’ 75 In arguing, then, for an understanding of law as always-already a technics of embodiment, I want to proceed to conceptualize the pilots and sensor operators who control the drones from their faraway locations in Nevada or Virginia as embodied prostheses of the laws of war grafted onto their respective technologies – both in ready- to-hand terms (joysticks and push- buttons) and in tele- techno mediated forms via satellite uplinks to and from the airborne drones. In this schema, the drones must be seen prosthetically as the ‘phantom members’ of the pilots and sensor operators. Operative here is a relation of indissociable articulation between seemingly separate parts – the human agent and the technological equipment – that is simultaneously predicated on technically augmenting the power and reach of the human agent through the fi gure of prostheticity. ‘Prostheticity,’ writes Stiegler ‘. . . is a putting outside- the-self that is also a putting- out-of- range-of- oneself.’ 76 As I discuss below, the putting- out-of- range-of- oneself through the prosthetics of drones is what enables the violent asymmetry that inscribes the conduct of drone warfare, with the drone operators safely ensconced in their ergonomic cubicles in the US while they rain down bombs on their suspect targets. In his work on the logic of the prosthesis, David Wills terms this process of articulation, the ‘contrivance of this transferential interface,’ ‘prosthesis.’ 77 The transferential interface operative between humans and technology, a somatechnics of law and its agents and targets, enables a prosthetic system of relationality that defi es categorical separation of different entities and fi gures. A parergonal schema unfolds here that blurs the lines between what is outside (the drone) and what is inside (the drone pilot in their GCS). Another name for this parergonal relation, Derrida remarks, is ‘the prosthesis.’ 78 This seemingly indivisible process of prostheticized grafting is something that is brought into clear focus by the observation of US Air Force Colonel Matt Martin, who remarks that, even as he is located at the GCS of Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, he views himself as having become completely coextensive with the drone he is piloting, regardless of the fact that the drone is actually fl ying thousands of miles away in Afghanistan: ‘I was already starting to refer to the Predator and myself as “I,” even though the airplane was thousands of miles away.’ 79 The seemingly indivisible prosthetic relation between drones and their human operators evidences, in effect, the emergence of a new type of war that could be termed ‘cyborg war.’ Drawing on Donna Haraway’s celebratory trope of resistance and overturning of oppressive and destructive regimes and epistemologies of power, I re- code the term in order to evidence its violent assimilation and co- option by the very phallogocentric, militaristic and instrumentalist authorities it was designed to contest: To recapitulate certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, animals – in short, domination of all constituted others . . . Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/ other, mind/body, culture/nature . . . High- tech culture challenges these dualisms in intriguing ways. It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and what body in machines that resolve into coding practices. 80 In the drone/human relation, it is not clear ‘who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine.’ The graft of the prosthetic blurs this boundary. Moreover, in the context of the digitized codes that interlink humans and drones in their operational schema, ‘It is not clear what is mind and what is body in machines that resolve into coding practices.’ The prosthetics of this new law of war, and its ensemble of human agents grafted to their drone technologies via screens, joysticks and satellite links, perfectly embodies the fi gure of the cyborg as the abject other to Haraway’s utopian trope. In keeping with the cyborg logic of the prosthetic, there is no ‘proper’ body in contradistinction to the machine; rather, couched in Derridean terms, ‘this prosthetic structure is not something we add to the “proper” body but it is already our experience of what is most proper to us, it is already the possibility of the prosthetic . . . thus technology or technè is already originally in place in our own body, in what is most proper to us.’ 81 This Derridean meditation on the infrastructural dimensions of the prosthetic effectively enables the critical interrogation of the categorical separation of the drone from its human agent. Belying its negative and reductive nomenclature, the drone cannot be reduced to a mindless machine of purely robotic acts; rather, the drone- as-prosthetic articulates a ‘prosthetics of origin,’ 82 to use Derrida’s titular term, that conjoins it inseparably, through grafting, to its embodied agents of cognition, refl ection and intent. Cyborg war, in this schema, instrumentalizes bodies into lethal machines via a prosthetic structure that operates in tandem with a parenthetical logic of disassociation between the doer and deed: machine/human, doer/deed are at once tactically conjoined in the acts of surveillance, targeting and killing and, simultaneously, disjoined from the ethical consequences of these same acts. The interstice that opens up between this parenthetical and prosthetic relation must be seen in terms of a critical fault line that compels examination. This fault line marks the radical asymmetries of power operative in the use of these drone killing technologies and their ethical ramifi cations. For the US, the use of the drones is justifi ed because it means that its soldiers are not placed in potentially fatal ground operations of war: no flesh and blood are lost, merely machines. A violent asymmetry governed by imperial relations of power inscribes the radically different positions of drone pilot and drone target. For the targets of this drone war, it is fl esh and blood that are shed, without the possibility of traditional combat counter- retaliation: drones kill silently, fi ring their missiles from a two- mile distance. With nothing to lose but machines, the US is now in a position to wage war without the usual weighing up of the human cost. The US military, in fact, terms its drones as ‘attritable’: ‘This means a commander can afford to lose one through attrition.’ 83 Qualms have been expressed by military personnel such as this unnamed Iraq combat veteran ‘who helped design much of the military’s doctrine for using unmanned drones’: ‘There’s something important about putting your own sons and daughters at risk when you choose to wage war as a nation. We risk losing that fl esh- and-blood investment if we go too far down this road.’ 84 The parenthetical logic of drone war brackets off the ethical questions concerning the waging of war while also suspending the fl esh- and-blood risks entailed by those fi ghting in the fi eld. P.W. Singer terms these new warriors ‘cubicle warriors’ ensconced in air- conditioned offi ces outfi tted with computers, joysticks and ergonomic furniture: ‘For a new generation, “going to war” doesn’t mean shipping off to some dank foxhole in a foreign land to dodge bullets. Instead, it is a daily commute in your Toyota Camry to sit behind a computer screen and drag a mouse.’ 85 Cubicle warriors are cyborg warriors prosthetically grafted, through satellite feeds, to their drones and yet effectively quarantined, through the parenthetical bracketing that is enabled by their cubicle location and screen technologies, from the risk and violence of the battlefi eld. The fault line that results from the contradictory spatio- temporal schemata that inform the operation of drones is effectively captured by the jargon term for drone pilots fl ying planes over 7,000 miles away from their location: ‘remote split operation.’ 86 Remote split operation refers to the manner in which drone pilots, located at their ground control stations in the US, are connected, via satellite links, to their f l ying charges thousands of miles away. I want to resignify this term so that it underscores the split or contradictory forces at work in the ensemble of fi gures and technologies that constitute drone operations. Remote split operations encapsulate the fault line that at once parenthetically brackets off the drone personnel from the locus of the battlefi eld while they are simultaneously prosthetically grafted to their drones via satellite links. The contradictory forces that inscribe drone technologies are not the product of accident; rather, they must be seen as having been produced by the design demands of the US military. In its brief to the teams of designers employed to produce UACVs, DARPA ‘wanted “intelligent function allocation” to allow the UACV to operate autonomously , while stressing the idea that the human controller would be expected to provide executive- level mission management to “remain in the decision process.” ’ 87 In this schema, the drone is an entity that ‘operates’ autonomously, and thus independently of its operators, and simultaneously it is instrumentally grafted to its human controller who will continue to make key decisions regarding its operations. The ‘autonomous’ operations of drones exemplifi es the conceptual shift from ‘technofetishism to technoanimism ,’ which, as Vivian Sobchack notes, constitutes one of the key attributes of the prosthetic once it is personifi ed so that it ‘is seen to have a will of its own.’ 88 The prosthetic grafting of drones to their land- based operators, however, opens up critical questions regarding accountability in the context of traditional laws of war that have failed to keep pace with the technological developments in the military fi eld. Singer encapsulates the cluster of problematics that now inscribe the f i eld: ‘While the party line is that the process for determining legal accountability would be the same as if a manned pilot made such a mistake [such as killing civilians], the new technology complicates matters. At times it was unclear which chain of command the pilots fell under as they were conducting combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan but sitting in Nevada.’ 89 Articulated in this blurring of lines of accountability is a complex network of prostheticized and tele- techno mediated relations and relays that can no longer be clearly demarcated along lines of categorical divisibility: such is precisely the logic of the prosthetic. As the military now attempts to grapple with this prostheticized landscape of war, it inevitably turns to technocratic solutions to solve questions of accountability concerning lethal drone strikes that kill the wrong targets: ‘It depends on the situation,’ rationalizes a DARPA-funded roboticist. ‘But if it happens too frequently, then it is just a product recall issue.’ 90 The language of ‘product recall,’ and consequent ‘product replacement,’ clearly enunciates the biopolitical instrumentalization of the life and death of the targeted other. The violent asymmetry of this new technocratic warfare is graphically marked by a homology between replaceable robots and disposable human life. In his refl ection on the violence of technoscientifi c rationality, Stiegler writes: ‘in what Weber calls rationalization, it is not rationality that rules but rather, in the name of rationality, a new form of political domination; one, however, which most importantly is no longer recognized as political domination since it fi nds itself legitimized by the progress of technoscientifi c rationality.’ 91 The violent biopolitical asymmetry that structures the conduct of imperial drone war is graphically materialized in the killing of Daraz Khan and two of his friends in southern Afghanistan. Daraz Khan and his friends were collecting scrap metal on a hillside when they were killed by a drone missile, after they were mistakenly taken to be planting mines in the area. The anomic violence of drone killings is perfectly encapsulated in this Pentagon response: ‘We’re convinced that it was an appropriate target . . . [although] we do not yet know exactly who it was .’ 92 The US state’s practice of killing anonymous targets (the names of the victims were only later revealed by their families) under the rubric of ‘signature strikes’ assumes its biopolitical dimensions once situated in its doctrine of ‘preventative’ war. In effect, as Robert Castel outlines in his Foucauldian elaboration of the state’s increasing use of practices of ‘preventative’ intervention: ‘There is, in fact, no longer a relation of immediacy with a subject because there is no longer a subject . What the new preventative policies primarily address is no longer individuals but factors liable to produce risk.’ 93 The US state’s use of drones in the ‘ungoverned’ spaces of the South evidences this insight: Daraz Khan and his friends were not ‘subjects’ – their identities, as the US military admits, were unknown – rather, they were viewed as a mere constellation of ‘risk factors’ that needed to be killed in an act of ‘anticipatory self- defense.’ In this case, the ‘calculus of probabilities’ was evidently high enough to determine the death of innocent civilians in order to secure a ‘preventative’ strike. The calculus of probabilities that enables the effective liquidation of the subject must be seen as a structural effect of a statist regime of visuality that instrumentalizes life in terms of an algebraic formula (patterns of life) that, together with the objectifying effects of screen technologies, works to render the material abstract (the human subject as non- subject), the individual generic (the fi gure in the landscape as mere index of risk factors) and the named anonymous (the individuating singularity of a proper name rendered superfl uous in the face of a computational risk calculus predicated on anonymous ‘patterns of life’). This statist regime of visuality, in effectively abstracting its human targets and reducing them to a calculable formula of ‘risk factors,’ is instrumental in enabling the administrative indifference to the obliteration of life that this type of seeing enables and sanctions. In his analysis of the necropolitical dimensions of empire, Achille Mbembe poses two critical questions that cut to the heart of these imperial asymmetries of power: ‘What difference is there between killing with a missile helicopter or a tank and killing with one’s body? Does the distinction between the arms used to infl ict death prevent the establishment of a system of general exchange between the manner of killing and the manner of dying?’ 94 In his essay, Mbembe does not iscuss the use of drones in war, however, his latter question can be effectively transposed to the imperial use of this technology: precisely what the necropolitical use of drones precludes is ‘a general system of exchange’ between the prosthetic tele- techno ensemble of the US imperial state and its anonymous and unsuspecting victims who have neither a right of reply nor recourse to judicial procedure. The necropolitical dimensions of drones are graphically underscored by the thanatological terminology that is used by the military to describe the vampiric death and resurrection of the drones in their everyday operations: ‘When not being used, the Predators are disassembled and stored at Indian Springs in crates that are called “coffi ns.” In turn, these are packed in what airmen refer to, naturally, as the “morgue.” At the time of deployment, the coffi ns are pulled from the morgue and airlifted to the forward operating base for reassembly.’ 95 Once they are resurrected from their coffi ns and deployed from their morgue depositories, drones become the bearers of anomic violence and airborne death. The type of automated execution that US drone warfare enables is tantamount to a type of international terrorism. Refl ecting on the legality of these automated executions with specifi c reference to the US killing of so- called ‘enemy combatants,’ Armin Krishnan argues that ‘Killing them abroad without giving them the opportunity to be arrested and receiving a fair trial would fall under the defi nition of international terrorism [as defi ned by U.N. Resolution 1556 (2004)].’ 96 The US’s drone attacks must be seen as instantiating Agamben’s concept of the ‘inexecution’ of law. ‘Every fi ction of a nexus between violence and law disappears here: there is nothing but a zone of anomie, in which violence without any juridical form acts.’ 97 Agamben’s ‘zone of anomie’ perfectly captures the zone of violence that designates the anonymous ‘patterns of life’ that can be killed by drones with impunity. Enframed by cameras and monitors, the victims of drone strikes become themselves mere ‘drones’ to the drones; scurrying insects that are dismembered and incinerated by the airborne fi re that is unleashed by the weaponized drones. In tropological terms, there is a complex process of prosopopoeia operative in the f i guration of drone technologies. On the one hand, as cyborg, the drone is brought to ‘life’ through the ruse of an animating logic that invests it with animal qualities of predatory agency. For example, following its successful strike on a target, the Predator drone is described in the literature in this manner: ‘The eyes of its Lynx side aperture have seen , and the talons of the AGM-114 Hellfi re missile on the starboard talon have struck .’ 98 On the other hand, there is operative a tropic transposition of the technology’s entomological nomenclature to the actual victims of the technology; the consequent process of animalization renders its human targets disposable. This view of the drone victims is evidenced by one drone commentator who likens the drone attacks to ‘going into a beehive, one bee at a time,’ with the resultant problem that ‘the hive will always produce more bees.’ 99 Drone crews talk about how they need ‘to kill bugs.’ 100 The CIA, in fact, terms a successful drone hit as ‘bugsplat.’ 101 The term ‘bugsplat’ caricatures its victims by inserting them within the fi eld of cartoon pop culture where, as disposable fi gures executed via what drone operators call ‘Kill TV,’ their deaths are scripted as mere comic mishap. ‘Bugsplat’ articulates the effective genealogical connections between video games and drone war games, as it is the actual name of a children’s interactive video game, now transposed to the killing operations of war. ‘Bugsplat’ reduces the human victims of drones to nothing more than liquefi ed entomological waste generated via a technology driven by a more highly evolved species – qua the human as opposed to the insect. Operative here is that foundational biopolitical caesura that effectively separates select humans from animals and that, simultaneously, enables the coding of certain other humans as animals that can be killed, as non- human animals are, with impunity. The speciesist recoding of human targets in terms of insects that can be liquidated without ethical scruples is further evidenced by the manner in which this violent military language has been reproduced by civilians watching drone strikes on YouTube. One YouTube blogger posted the following comment regarding a ‘Kill TV’ drone execution in Afghanistan: ‘You’re not watching murder, you’re watching pest extermination.’ 102 Drone attack videos have, in fact, become YouTube hits. Effectively recoding the agents and actors of this cyborg war into the very phallogocentric terms that Haraway opposed in her radical conceptualization of the cyborg, the YouTube viewers of drone killings talk about ‘drone porn’ giving them ‘raging hard ons.’ 103 Citing the work of Claudia Springer, Rosi Braidotti has underscored that ‘the social imaginary around cyborgs, or technologies, is masculine, militarized and eroticized. It supports images of hyper- masculine killing machines, with wired circuitry both replacing and reinforcing muscular power.’ 104 The social imaginary around drones evidences this assertion: their gleaming, hard metal armour, their lethal capabilities and their electronically enabled muscular power are all conducive to their hyper- masculinization and phallogocentric eroticization. The phallogocentricism that inscribes drones is perhaps best evidenced by the military terminology used to describe them: the ‘unmanned’ status of drones needs to be crucially supplemented by the prosthetic recoding of drones as ‘phantom members.’ The literality of the prosthetic relation between human subject and drone is clearly evidenced in the Pentagon’s development of ‘lenses which focus 3D battlef i eld from drones and satellites directly into people’s eyeballs.’ 105 In ‘A Vision for Air Force Science and Technology During 2010–2030,’ prosthetic technologies are identifi ed as a key area of development: Human performance augmentation will be essential for effectively using the overwhelming amounts of data that will be routinely available during this time . . . [T]his may include implants, drugs or other augmentation approaches to improve memory, alertness, cognition and visual/aural acuity. It may even extend to limited direct brainwave coupling between humans and machines, and screening of individual capacities for key speciality codes via brainwave patterns and genetic correlators. 106 Viewed in the context of the indissociable prosthetic relation between human and technology, there is nothing surprising in this ongoing investment in ‘human performance augmentation.’ What is disturbing is the mobilizing of the prosthetics of neuropharmaceuticals and implants in order to create more effi cient human killing machines. The prosthetics of this hyper- masculinization of war are perhaps nowhere more chillingly evidenced than in the US military’s possible use of beta- blocker drugs such as propanolol to deaden the emotional impact of a soldier exposed to the atrocities of war. 107 Jonathan Moreno has drawn attention to the experimental use of beta- blockers, originally used to treat heart disease, in order to ‘block neurotransmitters that consolidate emotion with long- term memory’ so that soldiers can circumvent the experience of post- traumatic stress after witnessing the horrors of battle. 108 Edmund Howe, a medical ethicist, outlines what is at stake in the military use of beta- blockers: ‘If you have the pill, it certainly increases the temptation for the soldier to lower the standard for taking lethal action, if he thinks he’ll be numbed to the personal risk or consequences. We don’t want a soldier saying willy- nilly, “Screw it. I can take my pill and even if doing this is not really warranted, I’ll be OK.” ’ 109 Drone operators, despite their remote locations, also claim to experience post- traumatic stress because of the ‘pretty graphic, pretty vivid’ images they are compelled to witness. 110 The parenthetical logic that inscribes drone killing operations can, in effect, be greatly enhanced precisely by the use of psychopharmacological prosthetics by drone pilots and the consequent numbing of their emotional response to the ‘remote’ killings they cause. Another dimension of the cyborg nature of the drone war that is being conducted in places such as Afghanistan is brought into focus by a recent WikiLeak: Flying over southern Afghanistan on a combat mission, one of the Air Force’s premier armed drones, a Reaper, went rogue. Equipped with advanced radar and sophisticated cameras, as well as Hellfi re missiles and 500-pound bombs, the Reaper had lost its satellite link to a pilot who was remotely steering the drone from a base in the United States. Again and again, the pilot struggled to regain control of the drone. Again and again, no response . . . As a last resort, commanders ordered an Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fi ghter jet to shoot down the $13 million aircraft before it soared into neighbouring Tajikistan. 111 In the tradition of Arthur C. Clarke’s rogue computer HAL, the drone Reaper here becomes a rogue cyborg that assumes a life of its own: recalcitrant to human commands or directives, it sets out on its own course. In this instance, it makes a mockery of DARPA’s offi cial vision of UACVs: ‘The UACV weapon system will exploit design and operational freedoms of relocating the pilot outside of the vehicle to enable a new paradigm shift in aircraft affordability while maintaining the rationale, judgment, and moral qualities of the human operator.’ 112 As a ‘rogue’ fi gure, it metaphorizes all too clearly the rogue status of its supposed commanders. As a rogue fi gure, it metonymically embodies the operations of a rogue state, the United States, that insistently confers this descriptor on its absolute others: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and so on. This fi gure of the rogue drone evokes a number of Derridean resonances as outlined in his Rogues , a text that makes a trenchant critique of the war on terror. Through his characteristic deconstructive manoeuvre of inversion and displacement, Derrida re- signifi es the US as itself a rogue state that legitimates its own exercise of violence in the conduct of the war on terror by drawing on the legalizing framework of international law: ‘Etats voyous [rogues], states denounced, confronted, and repressed by the police of supposedly legitimate states, those that respect an international law that they have the power to control.’ 113 Afghanistan, classifi ed by the US precisely as a rogue state, consequently must be ‘punished, contained, rendered harmless, reduced to a harmless state, if need be by the force of law [ droit ] and the right [ droit ] of force.’ 114 Cutting across the grain of the US administration’s doxic script, the rogue drone emblematizes the rogue status of its imperial master. The rogue drone evidences an ‘autoimmune pervertibility of democracy,’ performing the very self- destructive process of auto- immunity that haunts all attempts characterized by regimes of hyper- immunization, securitization and violent expulsion. 115 The concept of autoimmunity as materialized in this militarized context also renders, in Goldie Osuri’s words, ‘those who proclaim the war on terrorism as also subject to the charge of terrorism, by charging the accredited world power, the United States and its allies, with the responsibility for the current cycle and perpetuation of state and non- state violence.’ 116 Empire, amputees and the prosthetics of war In the course of this chapter, I have attempted to delineate the mutating terrain of contemporary war and the US’s increasing reliance on forms of automated killing- at-a- distance technologies. In this new fi eld of war, US combatants remain securely ensconced on home turf and the conduct of war and killing is now enmeshed within the continuum of the civic practices of everyday life. In this way, war, killing and [lacerating] maiming become coextensive, and thus normalized, with civic practices. With drone technologies, US military personnel or CIA agents venture into the fi eld of war through an ensemble of tele- techno mediations that prostheticize them to the killing machines deployed in the war- torn dominions of the US empire. Caught in these drone- generated killing fi elds are anonymous targets and civilians who have no right of response or recourse to judicial process as the drones f i re their missiles from the skies. In the context of this high- tech, prostheticized terrain of drone warfare that I have been mapping, I want to bring into focus the constitutive relation between war, prosthetics and the very civilian targets and victims caught in the ongoing imperial war in Afghanistan. In her critique of certain accounts of ‘technology as prosthesis,’ Sarah Jain draws attention to the manner in which technophilic readings of the prosthetic trope celebrate ‘technology as antidote’ while ‘the wounding ingredients of technological production remain continually under ontological erasure.’ 117 It is precisely this type of ontological erasure that I want to disrupt by juxtaposing my mobilization of the prosthetic trope with the material literality of prosthetics: drones, as the militarized prosthetics of empire, violently generate civilian amputees in need of prosthetic limbs. In their cultural history of modern prosthetics, Raiford Guins and Omayra Zaragoza Cruz have emphasized the constitutive relation between prosthetics, war and its victims: ‘The modern development of prosthetics has been traced with frequency to the challenges of war. The Civil War, for example, ushered in a new era for prosthetics because of the enormous scale of human damage that was infl icted by new technologies.’ 118 The anomic violence of drones and their violent production of amputees in need of literal prosthetics are evidenced in a report that recounts the story of a seventeen- year-old boy named Sadaullah living in Pakistan: Sadaullah was serving food at a family iftar, the traditional breaking of the daily fast during the holy month of Ramadan, when missiles from a drone struck his grandfather’s home and killed four of his relatives. Falling debris knocked Sadaullah out, but he survived. When he awoke in a Peshawar hospital, he found that both his legs had been amputated and shrapnel had penetrated his eye, rendering it useless. Pakistani media reported that the strike had killed Ilyas Kashmiri, a militant leader. But months later, Ilyas Kashmiri was seen alive in Afghanistan. It was only a few weeks ago that the militant was reportedly killed in yet another drone strike. 119 I counterpose this maiming of an innocent Pakistani boy by a drone against the US military’s naming of their thanatological machines as ‘guardian angels’ that ‘save lives.’ 120 Prosthetic extrapolations of law In refl ecting on the indissociable relation between law, technology and human subjects, drone technologies offer a graphic and specifi c instantiation of this relation. They exemplify the manner in which laws of war propel the development and use of particular technologies and they evidence the way in which these technologies of law are grafted onto human agents – such as pilots and sensor operators located at their remote ground stations – through a series of tele- techno mediations. I would argue, however, that this prosthetics of law, and its logics of somatechnical grafts that suture law, technology, and bodies into prostheticized ensembles, can be extrapolated into a larger schematic understanding of law as technology and technology as law, thereby offering an alternative paradigm to views that conceptualize law’s relation to technology in purely instrumentalist terms, views that fail to theorize the always- already prostheticized relation between law, bodies, technologies and their targets. A prosthetics of law is precisely what is operative across an extended micro and macro continuum that encompasses everything from police Taser(s) guns and batons, CCTVs, armed riot squads, to the spaces and institutions such as courts of law, prisons and detention centres. A prosthetics of law can be seen to be a critical materialization of the knowledge/power nexus that Foucault terms governmentality, that ‘ensemble formed by institutions, procedures . . . the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specifi c albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population . . . and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.’ 121 In the particular context that I have been examining, the prosthetics of law is what is enabled by the institution of the techno- militaryindustrial- security complex; it names the somatechnical relation that grafts law to bodies and technologies in the deployment of apparatuses of security – both internal and external to the nation- state. A prosthetics of law underscores the biopolitical dimensions of technologies of law as apparatuses exercising forms of normative and disciplinary power, what Foucault terms ‘orthopedic instruments’ concerned with the ‘correction, training, and taming of the body.’ 122 The prosthetics of law, that include such technologies as Taser guns and prisons, operate precisely to correct, train and tame the recalcitrant body into a docile subject. The prosthetics of laws of war operate, in biopolitical terms, to tame, correct, and to liquidate those targets that inhabit the ‘ungoverned’ spaces of the Global South. Enframed within racio- speciesist schemata and captured within the thanatological ensembles of the US techno- military-industrial- security complex, the suspect targets of the Global South can be exterminated with impunity in order to protect and safeguard the imperial nation- state. Prosthetics of empire and drone archipelagos In the conduct of its counter- terror operations, the Obama administration has effectively dropped the term ‘war on terror’ to describe its various battles. The war on terror has, indeed, been replaced by the more open- ended ‘war on al-Qaeda.’ The war on al-Qaeda marks a signifi cant shift in that it underscores that the fi eld of war can now be constituted virtually anywhere that al-Qaeda’s agents are to be found. In the wake of the military disasters of the large- scale Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the conduct of war has morphed into shadow wars. The US state’s shadow wars are conducted by drones in countries that have not been offi cially declared to be at war with the US. The imperial right of invasion and the overriding of a nation’s sovereignty are now accomplished through the prosthetics of empire: drones. The imperial right to kill those ‘patterns of life’ whose identities remain ‘unknown’ can now be exercised, through the prosthetics of empire, from the safety of home turf without putting the lives of US personnel at risk. Devoid of any transparent procedure and marked by the violence of absolutely asymmetrical relations of power, the killing- at-a- distance of suspect targets pivots on a risk calculus of probabilities underpinned by a techno- rationalist apparatus that effectively disassociates killer from killed. The state violence generated by drone killings is, in turn, complicated by the increasing use of non- state actors in the drone kill chain. The Obama administration has outsourced many aspects of the drone war to a number of contractors who are now responsible for the take- off, f l ying and landing of drones, even as they have to ‘hand the joystick controls over to a federal employee – either a CIA offi cer or someone in uniform’ once the target comes into the ‘kill box, meaning within range of launching its missiles.’ 123 In their analysis of the relations between state and private enterprise in the development of the US security state, Dana Priest and William Arkin underline that the military’s drones are ‘maintained in the fi eld by a cadre of private companies. Still other contractors, a who’s who of companies doing top secret work (including General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and SAIC), built, maintained, and staffed the global system that carried the drones’ surveillance data from overseas on to processing stations in the United States.’ 124 Private contractors such as Lockheed Martin are fi rmly ensconced in the US military’s ‘kill chain,’ as they also provide ‘the intelligence used to “locate and do Predator [drone] strikes.” ’ 125 The enmeshment of state and non- state actors in the exercise of militarized violence is clearly brought into focus in the case of a Science Application International Corporation employee, contracted to the Air Force to ‘analyze drone video and other intelligence from Afghanistan,’ who provided mistaken analysis that led to a military captain ordering ‘an airstrike on a convoy that turned out to be carrying innocent men, women and children.’ 126 Augmenting the production of state violence, non- state actors in the drone kill chain are driven by productivity quotas in terms of their targets: In some targeting programs, staffers have review quotas – that is, they must review a certain number of possible targets per given length of time. Because they are contractors, their continued employment depends on their ability to satisfy the stated performance metrics. So they have a fi nancial incentive to make life- or-death decisions about possible kill targets just to stay employed. 127 Operative here are a number of things: the diffusion, supplementation and enhancement of the state’s power to kill through private corporations and entities; the insertion of the Global South’s metricized and abstracted biopolitical targets within neoliberal economic agendas driven by productivity quotas and profi t outcomes; and the increasing lines of convergence between military and civic practices (for example, video analysis practices) such that a civico- militarized continuum of state violence is consolidating itself as a normative feature of the US nation- state. In this schema, non- state actors play instrumental roles in the conduct of the drone shadow wars and the state’s targeted killings. In this civico- militarized economy, it is virtually impossible to identify clear lines of demarcation between state and non- state actors in the generation and reproduction of violence. Non- state actors effectively mimic and reproduce state practices of violence with only one real critical difference: their investment in violence is avowedly driven by the desire to make a profi t. The war on terror, regardless of its nomenclatural permutations, has lost none of its capacity to generate terror through regimes of brutalizing and exterminatory violence. If the practices of torture and extraordinary rendition have been largely scaled down, but not terminated, by the Obama administration, then what has taken their place is the anomic violence of drones and the consolidation of the power of empire through the construction of a vast drone archipelago. The US state’s imperial drone archipelago encompasses a range of key geopolitical sites that include Sicily, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Seychelles, Turkey, Uzbekistan, the Philippines and Hawaii. This drone archipelago stretches from the Mediterranean, across the Indian and Pacifi c Oceans to the Atlantic, with clusters of drone bases dotting the entire breadth of the US mainland from Alaska to Florida. The Department of Homeland Security is planning to deploy drone surveillance fl ights across the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. This drone archipelago is, in other words, in a continuous state of expansion, with reports that the US is considering building a drone base on Australia’s Cocos Islands (Australia is already supplying, via the Pine Gap facility, a key information node in the drone network of satellite communication). The proposed Cocos Islands drone base will give the US a strategic base to surveil the whole of Asia and, in particular, the South China Sea. The Cocos Islands, described by one diplomat as the ‘crumbs of empire,’ were transferred from British to Australian possession in the dying days of the British Empire. 128 At the time of the transfer, Australia gave the United Nations assurances that the ‘islands would not be converted to military purposes.’ 129 This understanding now risks being violated. From its drone bases across the breadth of this militarized archipelago, the US is conducting globalized shadow wars in Central and Western Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Africa. Situated in this geopolitical arena, drones emerge as the new weapon of choice for the globalized maintenance and extension of US empire. In the words of the US military, drones ‘provide global vigilance, global reach, and global power.’ 130 In this alliterative summation of the power of drones, the global is framed as coextensive with the US state: the inside (US state) has encompassed its outside (the rest of the world). The US speaks in the name of the global precisely because it now enfolds it as an extension of its sovereign domain. As I move toward my conclusion, it is this very enmeshing of the inside/outside that I want to examine in more detail. The transnational dimensions of this imperial drone archipelago are foundationally enabled by domestic policies of imperial expropriation of Native American lands for the location of drone ground control stations. As I discussed in Chapter 1 , one of the key sites for the conduct of the drone killings in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, occupies expropriated Western Shoshone land. The drone archipelago, then, must be seen in terms of a trans/ national matrix of imperial state violence that inextricably binds an ensemble of diverse subjects (Native Americans and Afghans) and seemingly unrelated geographical sites (Western Shoshone country/Nellis AFB and the Afghan tribal lands). The US state’s intensive deployment of drones along its Mexican and Canadian borders in order to surveil and capture its other alien ‘patterns of life’ – ‘illegal aliens’ – underscores the need continually to reassert its sovereignty over those expropriated spaces of the nation that are constituted by borders that cut across Native American homelands. These militarized borders dismember and efface First Nation constituencies and peoples that fail to conform to the hegemonic cartographies of the imperial state. In his unpacking of the double logic that constitutes the exercise of state sovereignty, Jens Bartleson writes that ‘Without a “foreign policy” there can be nothing domestic, since the former has as its task precisely to defi ne the latter by domesticating what initially was foreign to it, buried in the depths of its violent prehistory and inserted as a state of nature in its contractual justifi cation.’ 131 In contemporary formations of state sovereignty, Bartleson adds, ‘what is now Other to the state is not primarily contained in its own prehistory, but temporally simultaneous yet spatially distinct from it.’ 132 I want to fl esh out Bartleson’s theoretical unpacking of state sovereignty by transposing it to the concrete territorial operations of the US state. The US state’s foreign policy on imminent threat and preventative wars, as conducted through the war on terror/al-Qaeda, re- enacts the violent domestication of what was ‘foreign’ to it even prior to its formal, constitutional establishment: Native Americans. The ‘violent prehistory’ that comes before the enunciative foundation of the US state through its formal Declaration of Independence fi gures precisely as a time synchronous with ‘a state of nature’ in which Native Americans are made, through the violence of the biopolitical caesura, coextensive with nature and are thereby relegated to the vestibule of ‘the culture’ where, as animals and lawless savages, they are compelled to undergo the colonial practices of ‘violent domestication.’ From the depths of this violence, the imperial domestication of the internal other works to establish the political and territorial sovereignty of the US state. Only after this fact can the US state delineate its territorial sovereignty, proceed to name its external/foreign others, and work to manage and control them through its foreign policies – all the while relegating its Indigenous peoples to the ‘spatially distinct’ zones of reservations, where a range of militarized and ecocidal practices can be performed by the imperial state with impunity. These two indissociable time- spaces, as chronotopes that found imperial state sovereignty, continue to inscribe the present: they topologically conjoin the violent ‘prehistory’ of the US state to contemporary trans/national iterations of state violence. The topological fold enabled by the prosthetics of drones evidences the indissociable conjoining of inside/outside in the conduct of the US state’s declared and shadow wars. In the exercise of sovereignty, Bartleson contends that a state’s foreign policy is ‘as much a policy for dealing with a traumatic past, as it is a policy for dealing with a spatial outside.’ 133 The topological fold that inscribes this particular exercise of imperial sovereignty instantiates the conjoined double movement of deploying foreign policy in order to deal with the internal trauma of the past and the trauma of an alien exteriority. The unresolved trauma of the US state’s Native American past is sutured to its contemporary trauma of alien exteriority in the conduct of the war on terror/al-Qaeda. The topological manifestation of this sovereign double trauma is graphically emblematized by the double execution of Geronimo/bin Laden that, in one killer instant, synchronizes the trauma of past and ongoing domestic Indian wars and the extra- national war on terror/al-Qaeda. The contemporized double killing of Geronimo as revenant attests to the failure of the US state to deal with a past trauma that, in fact, cannot be relegated to the past because it continues to inform the present. As an emblem of Native American resistance and of a history of colonial violence that has not been nationally acknowledged or overcome, Geronimo is the fi gure of internal alterity and unresolved trauma that, as spectre, cannot be ‘killed’: that is, he cannot be dialecticized and sublated through the murderous operations of imperial state violence. At the close of 2011, the Obama administration signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act that, among other things, effectively codifi es indefi nite military detention without trial, ensures that Guantánamo will remain open indefi nitely, expands and integrates the drone program into the system of US national airspace, and that, in the words of Senator Lindsey Graham, ‘basically say[s] in law for the first time that the homeland is part of the battlefi eld’ of the ongoing war on terror, as it enables the imprisonment without charge or trial of US citizens. 134 For Native Americans, the homeland has been part of the battlefi eld for hundreds of years, and the wars of terror that have ensued have been enabled by nothing less than the arsenal of white law and the violence of its ‘contractual justifi cation.’ The fi ction of the inaugural status of this momentous ‘fi rst time,’ as identifi ed by the said senator, can only be maintained by continuing to bury in the depths of prehistory all the other battles, past and present, that have harrowed the homelands of Native Americans.

#### Voting aff combines the best of both worlds --- we should synthesize modern notions of solidarity, alliances, consensus, universal rights, macropolitics and institutional struggle with postmodern notions of difference, plurality, multiperspectivalism, identity, and micropolitics

#### (A) The alternative to this synthesis is a conservative version of liberalism and identity politics crowding out the debates over drones ---- both are complicit with drone strikes ---- we need a strong coalition of stakeholders in the community to challenge the drone empire

KISHORE 2011 - National Secretary of the Socialist Equality Party (Kishore, Joe, December 29, 2011, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-s-global-murder-inc/28388?print=1>)

The Obama administration has erected a vast apparatus of global assassination involving unmanned aerial drones operated by the CIA and the military. This network of “targeted killing” machines is run in secrecy, behind the backs of the American people and with virtually no congressional oversight. The US drone program is the subject of an exposé published in the Washington Post on Wednesday, headlined “Under Obama, an emerging global apparatus of drone killing.” While restrained in its presentation, the Post article is a chilling account of a government that has asserted for itself the right to kill anyone, anywhere in the world, without even a pretense of legal proceedings. The lives of thousands of people have been wiped out in this manner. The US drone program, according to the Post, “involves dozens of secret facilities, including two operational hubs on the East Coast, virtual Air Force cockpits in the Southwest and clandestine bases in six countries on two continents.” A study by the Congressional Budget Office concluded that the US had 775 Predator and other drone aircraft, plus an unknown number operated by the CIA as part of covert operations. Not including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, assassinations have been carried out in at least three countries. The recent downing of a drone over Iran, however, points to much broader operations. One of Obama’s first actions as president was to order a Predator drone attack on Pakistan. Since then, nearly 240 attacks have been carried out against the country, killing thousands, mostly civilians. Some 15 strikes have been launched against Yemen, and several others in Somalia. The Post provides a description of competing “kill lists” drawn up by the CIA and the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), with no publicly available information on the criteria used to select targets for assassination. The CIA’s list is apparently shorter than the military’s, which some in the drone program attribute to the fact that it has had less time to compile it. “Over time, officials said, the agency would catch up.” Among those killed have been three US citizens, including Anwar Al-Awlaki by the CIA on September 30 and his 16-year old son by the JSOC a few weeks later, both in Yemen. In the latter attack, the Post claims, the young Awlaki was not the intended target. “A US citizen with no history of involvement with al-Qaeda,” he was, instead, “an unintended casualty.” In explaining the increase in drone assassinations, the Post cites the official closure of CIA detention programs and an end to new transfers to Guantanamo Bay. This left “few options beyond drone strikes…” In other words, instead of locking alleged “terrorists” in prison camps and torture centers, the Obama administration decided it would be more efficient to simply kill them in secrecy. Separate congressional panels supposedly have oversight over these two different programs. However, “Neither panel is in a position to compare the CIA and JSOC kill lists or even arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the rules by which each is assembled,” the newspaper reports. Congressional leaders of both parties are entirely complicit, with leaders of intelligence and military committees submitting to restrictions on public discussion. “Senior Democrats barely blink at the idea that a president from their party has assembled such a highly efficient machine for targeted killing of suspected terrorists,” the Post comments. President Lyndon Johnson, coming to power in the wake of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, famously acknowledged that the CIA had been operating a “damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean,” which included plots to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Nixon administration was involved in many assassination plots, which contributed to the scandals and impeachment inquiries that eventually forced his resignation. Investigations by the US Senate’s Church Committee in the mid-1970s led up to an executive order officially barring the practice of assassination. The actions of the Obama administration, and the vast growth in the secret powers of the CIA and the military, go far beyond these past crimes. Extra-judicial state-sanctioned killing is a metastasis of the global “war on terror,” an escalation of international criminality that has included the launching of aggressive wars, indefinite detention, and torture. It has become a central component of US military policy, including the war in Libya, which was concluded with the US-backed assassination of Muammar Gaddafi. Obama has singled out the extra-legal killing of Osama bin Laden as a high point and defining moment of his administration. Unbridled violence and the suppression of democracy are two sides of the same process. The revelations by the Post come less than two weeks after the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act, which for the first time provides an explicit congressional imprimatur on the indefinite military detention of US citizens and non-citizens alike, at the discretion of the president. The act effectively abolishes the writ of habeaus corpus and basic constitutional guarantees of due process. The administration that is overseeing this assertion of quasi-dictatorial powers, headed by Obama, is essentially an alliance of powerful financial interests and the military-intelligence apparatus. This government of extreme reaction has the crucial support of sections of the affluent middle class, which, on the basis of identity politics, has reconciled itself to policies that go beyond even those carried out by the Bush administration. Anything is acceptable, even “progressive,” so long as it is carried out by an African-American president. The operation of a global assassination network receives at most a pro-forma rebuke from the likes of the Nation and other “left” backers of the Democratic Party. One liberal commentator, Ta-Nehisi Coates, a senior editor for the Atlantic magazine, blithely commented in response to the Post piece: “Drones are the perfect weapons of democracy. One gets all the credit for killing the country’s enemies, and none of the blame for military casualties. The occasional slaughter of a 16-year-old boy is surely regrettable, but of almost zero political import.” The defense of democratic rights and the defeat of American imperialism, along with the struggle against social inequality, depend on the emergence of a mass political movement of the working class on the basis of a socialist program. This movement will come into direct conflict with the Obama administration, the Democratic Party and its “left” apologists.

#### (B) The answer is not a reactionary rejection of either liberalism and identity politics whole-heartedly, but an epistemological intervention that can negotiate those tensions can better give us the tools to navigate the social world ---- liberalism is here to stay, but utilizing a global frame to challenge its more local, problematic materializations can help create coalitions for a better future to come

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The postmodern turn which has so marked social and cultural theory also involves conflicts between modern and postmodern politics. In this study, we articulate the differences between modern and postmodern politics and argue against one-sided positions which dogmatically reject one tradition or the other in favor of partisanship for either the modern or the postmodern. Arguing for a politics of alliance and solidarity, we claim that this project is best served by drawing on the most progressive elements of both the modern and postmodern traditions. Developing a new politics involves overcoming the limitations of certain versions of modern politics and postmodern identity politics in order to develop a politics of alliance and solidarity equal to the challenges of the coming millennium. \*\*\*\*\*\*\* In the past two decades, the foundational claims of modern politics have been challenged by postmodern perspectives. The grand visions of emancipation in liberalism, Marxism, and other political perspectives of the modern era have been deemed excessively totalizing and grandiose, occluding differences and neglecting more specific oppressions of individuals and disparate groups. The liberal project of providing universal rights and freedoms for all has been challenged by specific groups struggling for their own rights, advancing their own specific interests, and championing the construction of their own cultures and identities. The Marxian project of revolution, worldwide and global in scope, has been replaced in some quarters by more localized struggles and more modest and reformist goals. The result is a variety of new forms of postmodern politics whose discourses, practices, and effects we shall interrogate in this study. In our view, the contemporary world is undergoing major transformations and the discourse of the postmodern serves to call attention to the changes and novelties of the present moment. In this context, the postmodern turn in politics describes the new forms of political conflict and struggle. The present conjuncture is highly ambiguous, positioning those in the overdeveloped Western and Northern areas between the era of modernity and a new epoch for which the term postmodernity has been coined, while people in other parts of the world are still living in premodern social and cultural forms, and on the whole the developing world exists in a contradictory matrix of premodern, modern, and postmodern forms. The rapid transformation of the world and development of novel cultural forms generates new dangers, such as the potential loss of the modern traditions of humanism, the Enlightenment, and radical social traditions, as well as innovative possibilities, such as emerge from new technologies, new identities, and new political struggles. The old theories, concepts, modes of thought and analysis, will only go so far in theorizing, analyzing, and mapping the emerging constellations, thus requiring novel modes of thought, strategies, discourses, and practices. Accordingly, in addition to the transformations in theory, the arts, and the sciences from the modern to the postmodern which we have discussed in our books \_Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations\_ (1991) and \_The Postmodern Turn\_ (1997),[1] there have occurred calls for a new postmodern politics to overcome the limitations of modern politics. Indeed, the contemporary terrain shows a mutation in political thought and practice that parallels and is informed by changes in theory. As with postmodern theory, there is no one "postmodern politics," but rather a conflicting set of positions that emerges from the ambiguities of social change and multiple postmodern theoretical perspectives. Yet the different categories of postmodern politics are not merely conceptual distinctions, but are actual political tendencies played out in the public sphere, in the universities, in the workplace, and in everyday life. Thus, as new technologies transform every aspect of life, as culture plays a more crucial role in domains from the economy to personal identity, and as capital creates a new global economy and new syntheses of the global and the local abound, politics too takes on new forms and content. Generally characterized, the project of modern politics was to define and implement universal goals like freedom, equality, and justice, in an attempt to transform institutional structures of domination. Modern politics emerged from the Enlightenment project of subjecting to critique by the norms of reason all forms of authority and all existing institutions. Modern politics presupposed a democratic public sphere where individuals and social groups could discuss political problems and choices, and intervene practically in public affairs. Modern politics involved attempts to discern basic human rights, the common good and universal values, and to provide institutional guarantees that allow democratic rights, discussion, and consensus. Thus, the American Revolution declared the universal rights of "all people" to be "self-evident truths" as revealed by the light of Reason. The French Revolution championed the universal "Rights of Man" on the basis of liberty, egality, fraternity and Mary Wollstonecraft published a treatise \_Vindication of the Rights of Women\_ shortly thereafter.[2] Attempting to realize these universal appeals beyond the limiting context of bourgeois class relations, Marx urged that the "Workers of the World Unite!" to create an international politics of solidarity designed to overthrow bourgeois property forms. In the Americas and then in Africa, Asia, and throughout the non-Western world, national liberation movements emerged which challenged colonialism and sought to bring the promises of modern democracy and liberty to areas of the world sunk in oppression. Simon Bolivar's struggles for Latin American freedom, the slave revolts of the Caribbean, and Jose Marti's vision of \_Nuestra America\_, free of colonial domination, articulated the yearnings unleashed by the modern project and attempts to realize its promises, where later liberation movements claimed that only socialism can redeem the sufferings of the "wretched of the earth" and realize the promises of modernity. Yet the promises and yearnings of modernity and modern politics were seldom realized. Workers were exploited throughout the modern epoch by rapacious capital; women were only able to gain full democratic rights by the early decades of the 20th century and continued to suffer patriarchal domination; people of color were systematically discriminated against by the forces of racism; and the developing countries continued to be oppressed by the imperialist powers. Despite war, poverty, hunger, economic depression, and fierce forms of subjugation and suffering, modern politics was optimistic in its outlook; indeed, it was often religious in its teleological faith that the progressive logic of history would soon be realized. Enlightenment faith in a better future inspired liberalism and Marxism alike. Thus, modern politics was informed by strong normative values and utopian visions of a world of universal freedom, equality, and harmony. Forms of Postmodern Politics A postmodern politics begins to take shape during the 1960s, when numerous new political groups and struggles emerged. The development of a new postmodern politics is strongly informed by the vicissitudes of social movements in France, the United States, and elsewhere, as well as by emerging postmodern theories. The utopian visions of modern politics proved, in this context, difficult to sustain and were either rejected in favor of cynicism, nihilism, and, in some cases, a turn to the right, or were dramatically recast and scaled down to more "modest" proportions. The modern emphasis on collective struggle, solidarity, and alliance politics gave way to extreme fragmentation, as the "movement" of the 1960s splintered into various competing struggles for rights and liberties. The previous emphasis on transforming the public sphere and institutions of domination gave way to new emphases on culture, personal identity, and everyday life, as macropolitics were replaced by the micropolitics of local transformation and subjectivity. In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us." [3] The flip-side of a negative and nihilistic postmodern politics is an affirmative postmodern politics. Such positive postmodern positions range from an apolitical New Age life-style postmodernism to a self-conscious oppositional postmodernism, a postmodernism of resistance.[4] New Age postmodernism is largely a form of apolitical individualism that emphasizes transformation of life-style and values, while eschewing traditional politics. New Age spirituality is a kind of pop postmodernism that envisions a "new age" of spirituality that overcomes the excesses of capitalist materialism and consumerism in favor of God, the soul, and the body, while blending together numerous philosophies and traditions in a potpourri marketable to all tastes. Another form of affirmative postmodern politics also rejects traditional modern politics and attempts at large-scale social transformation, in favor of piecemeal reforms and local strategies. This is the position of Foucault, Lyotard, and Rorty, all of whom reject a global politics of systemic change in favor of modifications at the local level designed to enhance individual freedom and progressive change. Foucault and Lyotard reject utopian thought and the category of "totality" as terroristic, while searching for new "styles" of life "as different as possible from each other" (Foucault) and a proliferation of "language games" in "agonistic" opposition to one another (Lyotard). Rorty merely -- and meekly -- seeks "new descriptions" of reality that pluralize the voices in the social "conversation," as he replaces normative critique with "irony" and retires philosophy to a limited role in private life. This form of postmodern politics, consequently, is but a refurbished liberal reformism that fails to break with the logic of bourgeois individualism and undermines attempts to construct bold visions of a new reality to be shaped by a more radical and ambitious politics of alliance and solidarity. Another typology involves a reconstructive postmodernism that combines modern and postmodern politics. More extreme negative and affirmative postmodernism involves a decisive break and rejection of modern politics, calling for a radical discontinuity and dramatically different politics. This ranges from negative and cynical postmodernism that rejects all politics and action for a stance of negativism, defeatism, and nihilism to New Age emphasis on life-style and the transformation of subjectivity, to a new postmodern politics rooted in the struggles of new social movements and developments in postmodern theory. Such a form of reconstructive postmodern politics, however, advanced by Laclau and Mouffe, among others, stakes out a position between the modern and postmodern, in order to use postmodern critiques of essentialism, reductionism, and foundationalism to reconstruct Enlightenment values and socialist politics through a logic of contingency and plurality.[5] Rejecting the Marxist reduction of emancipatory politics to class struggle that privileges the working class, Laclau and Mouffe embrace the "new social movements" of the 1970s and 1980s as multiple sources of progressive change which can bring about "radical democracy." According to Mouffe, Enlightenment universalism was instrumental in the emergence of democratic discourse, but "it has become an obstacle in the path of understanding those new forms of politics, characteristic of our societies today, which demand to be approached from a nonessentialist perspective. Hence, the necessity of using the theoretical tools elaborated by the different currents of what can be called the postmodern in philosophy and of appropriating their critique of rationalism and subjectivism."[6] Universal values are not entirely abandoned -- e.g., the concept that everyone has certain rights -- but they enter into a "new kind of articulation" with particular values and a logic of irreducible difference. Yet for this postmodern politics, the rejection of essentialism and lack of solid "foundations" does not entail nihilism or the abandonment of the global political project. As Laclau puts it: Abandonment of the myth of foundations does not lead to nihilism, just as uncertainty as to how an enemy will attack does not lead to passivity. It leads, rather, to a proliferation of discursive interventions and arguments that are necessary, because there is no extradiscursive reality that discourse might simply reflect. Inasmuch as argument and discourse constitute the social, their open-ended character becomes the source of a greater activism and a more radical libertarianism. Humankind, having always bowed to external forces -- God, Nature, the necessary laws of History -- can now, at the threshold of postmodernity, consider itself for the first time the creator and constructor of its own history. The dissolution of the myth of foundations -- and the concomitant dissolution of the category `subject' -- further radicalizes the emancipatory possibilities offered by the Enlightenment and Marxism.[7] The shift to a postmodern logic, in other words, leads to "an awareness of the complex strategic-discursive operations implied by [the] defense" of Enlightenment values.[8] Thus, for Laclau and Mouffe postmodern philosophy and social theory do not entail a rejection of key political commitments to modernity itself. For them, nothing in the radical political project is lost with the rejection of foundationalism and everything is gained through the liberating effects of a new logic of difference and contingency. In Mouffe's words, "far from seeing the development of postmodern philosophy as a threat, radical democracy welcomes it as an indispensable instrument in the accomplishment of its goals."[9] To speak ironically, we could say that the postmodern critique puts the modern project on even firmer "grounds" than Enlightenment rationality, insofar as its values are not simply dogmatically stated, but are given pragmatic and consensual grounds of justification. Hence, their approach is very similar to that of Habermas, who sees the Enlightenment as an "unfinished project" and seeks communicative grounds of normative justification, with the key difference that Laclau and Mouffe believe that postmodern theory has radical democratic potential, whereas Habermas believes that it weakens the Enlightenment tradition and aids irrationalist, conservative, traditions. Finally, there is another mode of affirmative postmodern politics, perhaps the dominant form of politics today, known as "identity politics" that often has emancipatory aspirations but which usually falls short of advancing systemic change and new forms of radical struggle. " Identity (ID) politics " refers to a politics in which individuals construct their cultural and political identities through engaging in struggles or associations that advance the interests of the groups with which they identify. Sometimes identification is concrete, based on participatory involvement in specific groups, while sometimes it is more imaginary and abstract in nature, as one identifies, for example, with the black, gay and lesbian, or with whatever community from which one gains their identity and sense of self and belonging. Identity (ID) politics has its origins in the "new social movements" of the 1970s and 1980s and, ultimately, the struggles of the 1960s. Yet the "movement" of the '60s both pursued a coalition and alliance politics and challenged the dominant powers on multiple levels -- gender, race, the hierarchical structure of the universities, colonial domination, U.S. imperialism in Vietnam, the alienated nature of work, sexual repression, and the oppressive organization of everyday life. In the 1970s, however, the "movement" fragmented into the "new social movements" which included feminist, black liberation, gay and lesbian, and peace and environmental groups, each fighting for their own interests (e.g., blacks saw the emerging environmental movement in the late 1960s as a bourgeois diversion from civil rights struggles, and environmentalists emphasized wilderness issues while ignoring problems of urban pollution). By the 1980s and 1990s, as the Balkanization process continued, the "new social movements" had become transformed into "identity politics," the very name suggesting a turn away from general social, political, and economic issues toward concerns with culture and personal identity. Identity (ID) politics bears the influence of postmodern theory, which is evident in the critique of modern reductionism, abstract universalism, and essentialism, as well as a use of multiperspectival strategies that legitimate multiple political voices. Foucault's genealogical politics, for example, is explicitly designed to liberate suppressed voices and struggles in history from the dominant narratives that reduce them to silence. In identity (ID) politics, individuals define themselves primarily as belonging to a given group, marked as "oppressed" and therefore as outside the dominant white male, heterosexual, capitalist culture. These identities revolve around a "subject position," a key identity marker defined by one's gender, race, class, sexual preference, and so on, through which an individual is made subordinate to the dominant culture. Although class is certainly a major form of identity, identity (ID) politics typically is defined in opposition to class politics. But although postmodern theory usually attacks essentialism, there is a form of essentialism in many modes of identity (ID) politics which privilege gender, race, sexual preference, or some other marker as the constituent of identity. Moreover, through [obsessing] fetishizing a single all-defining personal identity (woman, black, gay, etc.), identity (ID) politics also departs from the insight of postmodern theory that identities are multiple and socially constructed, and that they need to be reconstructed in an emancipatory, autonomous, and self-affirming fashion. In other words, some versions of identity politics [obsess] fetishize given constituents of identity, as if one of our multiple identity markers were our deep and true self, around which all of our life and politics revolve. In some forms, identity politics also dovetails with liberal interest group politics that seeks to advance the interests of a single specific group, typically in opposition not only to the dominant groups, but also to other marginalized and oppressed groups. Thus, in contrast to the universal and collective emphases of modern politics, a postmodern identity (ID) politics tends to be insular and something of a special interest group, perhaps itself a postmodern phenomenon. Hence, whereas modern politics focused on universalistic goals like gaining civil liberties, reducing inequalities, or transforming structures and institutions of domination, postmodern identity (ID) politics singles out the specific interests of a group and constructs identities through identification with the group and its struggles. Of course, critics of modern politics have indicated from the beginning that the universalistic claims of modern theorists and politicians were cloaks for advancing the particular interests of ruling groups, mainly white male property owners. The cardinal rights advanced by the bourgeois revolutions in the United States, France, and elsewhere were those of property rights which granted supreme economic and political power to white male capitalists in flagrant contradiction to their democratic rhetoric. Yet the new universalist ideology of modern politics unleashed a power that the ruling classes could not restrain; it inspired and legitimated the struggles of the very groups it was used to suppress, including those advocating identity politics today, who denounce universalist appeals as inherently ideological and oppressive. Yet classical Marxism also advanced a reductionist and essentialist view of politics that is repudiated by postmodern politics. Marx theorized labor as a "universal class" which by emancipating itself will emancipate all other oppressed groups. On Marx's scheme, subjectivity is constituted as a class identity and all social antagonisms devolve around production as the essence of the social. Later Marxists continued with this policy, subsuming other key social issues to the "woman question," "race question," "national question," and so on, failing to see how race, gender, nationality, and other forms of identity were crucial and often more directly relevant for many different groups of people, just as nationalism proved a far more powerful identity than did international workers' solidarity for various European workers during the first World War. Yet Marxist politics was not effectively displaced as the dominant radical political discourse and movement until the 1960s, with the explosion of new struggles and identities that fundamentally contested advanced capitalist society. Identity politics as it is defined today departs -- explicitly or implicitly -- from a critique of Marxist politics. The break from the essentialist and reductionist logic informing certain Marxist conceptions of class struggle has had liberating effects in the political field. It allowed for new conceptions of micropolitics, pluralist democracy, and a politicization of the multiple ways in which the subject is constituted across numerous institutional sites and in everyday life. Yet there are also problematic elements in extreme postmodern rejections of some classical positions within modern politics. Contributions and Limitations of Postmodern Politics One of the key insights of the postmodern turn, theorized by Foucault, was that power is everywhere, not only in the factories, but in the schools, prisons, hospitals, and all other institutions. This insight is both depressing, since it acknowledges that power saturates all social spaces and relations, and exhilarating, because it allows for and demands new forms of struggle. Hence, multiple forms of resistance open up along every line of identity that is controlled or normalized. The movements of the period challenged capitalism, state power and bureaucracy, the repressive organization of everyday life in the midst of consumer society, along with various modes of ideologically constituted identities. Postmodern politics, following capital and state intervention processes themselves, represents a politicization of all spheres of social and personal existence, which were previously ignored or rejected by modern and Marxist approaches as proper political spaces. With postmodern politics, every sphere of social life becomes subject to questioning and contestation, and the sites of struggle multiply. With the pluralistic approach, power is more vulnerable to attack and hence Foucault emphasized the contingency and frailty of power relations. Where a Leninist would argue that pluralized struggle only dissipates the centralized forces needed to combat capital and the state, a politically radical postmodernist would respond that the new struggles attack the weak links of the system and spread resistance everywhere, thereby allowing for the general attack that Leninists rightly think is necessary for overthrowing capitalism. Hence, the 1960s brought a shift from a macropolitics that focused on changing the structure of the economy and state to a micropolitics that aims to overturn power and hierarchy in specific institutions, and to liberate emotional, libidinal, and creative energies repressed by the reality principle of bourgeois society. An important aspect of micropolitics, as evident in the work of Lyotard, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, is a politics of subjectivity which theorizes the conditions under which the modern subject has emerged as both an effect of power, what Foucault calls the "subjectification" of individuals. This entails primarily a struggle against the "microfascism" latent in everyone, to be combatted by breaking out of, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, the "molar" pole of desire (such as informs all normalized subjectivities) and finding the "molecular" lines of escape. For Foucault, the politics of subjectivity involves a "politics as ethics" which creates new subjects on the Greek model of an "aesthetics of existence."[10] Postmodern models of politics are trying to redefine the "political" based on changes in society, technology, economics, and everyday life. A postmodern cultural politics, building on the insights of Gramsci, the surrealists, Lefebvre, and the situationists, thematizes culture as a crucial terrain of power and struggle. To the extent that social reproduction is now largely achieved at the levels of culture and everyday life, where the individual is a target of total administration, questions of subjectivity, ideology, culture, aesthetics, and utopian thought take on a new importance. The instrumentalist, pragmatic, or rationalist conception of political struggle, which attempts to shape "political consciousness," class or otherwise, and mobilize political insight into a political movement that transcends questions of culture, is insufficient because it begs the question of how a political movement will be possible in the first place, given the degree of subjective identification with dominant modes of thought and behavior throughout society. As thinkers like Reich and Adorno saw, fascism has roots not only in the crisis of monopoly capital, but also in the repression of the instinctual structure and the emergence of an "authoritarian personality." Thus, if people live immersed in a culture colonized by capitalism, a culture of spectacles that binds affect and mobilizes pleasures to its sights, sound, and experiences, then the struggle for culture, subjectivity, and identity is no longer secondary to the struggle for society, and both cultural and identity politics are crucial for breaking from the dominant ideologies and creating new forms of life and consciousness. Given the need to produce new subjectivities, political education, rational persuasion, and moral appeals remain of the greatest importance, but they can be very weak opponents of the seductive pleasures of MTV, blockbuster films, the Internet, fashion and advertising, and commodity consumption of all kinds. In Marcuse's words, "no persuasion, no theory, no reasoning can break this prison [of subjectivity], unless the fixed, petrified sensibility of the individuals is `dissolved,'opened to a new dimension in history, until the oppressive familiarity with the given object world is broken - broken in a second alienation: that from the alienated society."[11] It is culture that molds the sensibilities and thus a radical cultural politics attempts to undo the enculturation of the dominant culture by providing new ways of seeing, feeling, thinking, talking, and being. Progressives today must not simply fall back on the old valorization of critical realism and its narrow cognitive models, as valuable as didactic and pedagogical art might be. What is ultimately needed are new affective structures and modes of experience which can act as catalysts and the condition of the possibility of broader social and political transformations. Here, the political function of critical art becomes, negatively, a defamiliarization from the dominant mode of experiencing reality, what Marcuse has termed an alienation from alienation. Such has been the practice of Brecht's epic theater, Artaud's theater of cruelty, or Godard's anti-narrative films, all of which sought to question and displace the dominant mode of experiencing reality, rather than reproduce it through staid aesthetic conventions. Positively, a cultural politics has the task of "aesthetic education," the reshaping of human needs, desires, senses, and imagination through the construction of images, spectacles, and narratives that prefigure different ways of seeing and living. Situationist art, for example, practiced both functions, the negative through its deconstruction of advertisements and other images (detournement), and the positive through experiences with the "constructed situation," a practice earlier advanced by the surrealists in their various exercises and games (such as "the exquisite corpse") designed to liberate unconscious creative forces. Paradoxically, today we find the atrophy of the senses in their hypertrophic extension throughout the sensorium of the spectacle and its images and commodity empires.[12] Against Lukˆcs, we emphasize the importance of formal innovation and avant-gardism in the arts, where such new techniques and modes of vision can help people break with repressive identifications with both the utilitarian (instrumental reason) and affective (sign value) modes of experience constituted by advanced capitalism. A new society will never be attainable until it is experienced as a need, as a desire for new modes of community, work, experience, social interaction, and relations to the natural world that could never be satisfied within capitalism and therefore cannot be coopted by economic reforms. As Bahro saw,[13] capitalism generates needs and desires it ultimately cannot satisfy for freedom, justice, self-realization, and a good life, and a radical cultural politics will depict both how the current mode of social organization restricts, limits, and deforms desire, freedom, and justice, while projecting visions of how these aspirations could be realized. Both the radical negations of society by certain forms of critical modernism (i.e. Kafka, Beckett, German Expressionism, etc.) and the utopian dimension of art stressed by theorists such as Bloch and Marcuse is thus more relevant than ever today when radical critique is needed to free individuals from forms of oppression of which they are often unaware and when a better way of life is technically possible for all. In addition to cultural politics, postmodern politics has often developed new political strategies and politicized new domains of life. The European autonomous movements that George Katsiaficas, for instance, has described struggle to politicize, among other things, housing and have developed squatters movements to occupy abandoned houses or deteriorating urban neighborhoods.[14] In addition, the automomous movements have been active in local anti-nuclear struggles, attacking local nuclear installations and protesting against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Indeed, throughout the world postmodern politics have affixed themselves to new social movements and localized struggles.

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity (ID) politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics, as if it were an either/or proposition, but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives, embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] There are certainly many things to be depressed about is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation. While postmodern politics and theory tend to polarize into either the extremely negative or excessively affirmative, key forms of postmodern literature have a more dialectical vision. Indeed, some of the more interesting forms of postmodern critique today are found in fictional genres such as cyberpunk and magical realism. Cyberpunk, a subgenre within science fiction, brings science fiction down to earth, focusing not on the intergalactic battles in the distant future, but the social problems facing people on earth in the present.[17] Cyberpunk writers such as Bruce Sterling and William Gibson offer an unflinching look at a grim social reality characterized by transnational capitalist domination, Social Darwinist cultural settings, radical environmental ruination, and the implosion of the body and technology, such that humans become more and more machine like and machines increasingly become like human beings. Yet cyberpunk novels foreground this nightmare world in order to warn us that it is an immanent possibility for the near future, in order to awaken readers to a critical reflection on technology and social control, and to offer hope for alternative uses of technology and modes of social life. Similarly, magical realism examines the wreckage of centuries of European colonialism, but also maintains a positive outlook, one that embraces the strength and creativity of the human spirit, social solidarity, and spiritual and political transcendence. Like cyberpunk novels, magical realism incorporate various aesthetic forms and conventions in an eclectic mixture that fuses postmodernism with social critique and models of resistance. But it is also a mistake, we believe, to ground one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory alone. Against one-sided positions, we advocate a version of reconstructive postmodernism that we call a politics of alliance and solidarity that builds on both modern and postmodern traditions. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se, we believe that the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for political struggle today and are skeptical whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics. Yet the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides (such as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in "progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critique of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and modernity are in order, unlike Habermas we believe that postmodern theory has important contributions to make to this project. Various forms of postmodern politics have been liberatory in breaking away from the abstract and ideological universalism of the Enlightenment and the reductionist class politics of Marxism, but they tend to be insular and fragmenting, focusing solely on the experiences and political issues of a given group, even splintering further into distinct subgroups such as divide the feminist community. Identity (ID) politics are often structured around simplistic binary oppositions such as Us vs. Them and Good vs. Bad that pit people against one another, making alliances, consensus, and compromise difficult or impossible. This has been the case, for example, with tendencies within radical feminism and ecofeminism which reproduce essentialism by stigmatizing men and "male rationality" while exalting women as the bearers of peaceful and loving value and as being "closer to nature."[18] Elements in the black nationalist liberation movement in the 1960s and the early politics of Malcolm X were exclusionist and racist, literally demonizing white people as an evil and inferior race. Similarly, the sexual politics of some gay and lesbian groups tend to exclusively focus on their own interests, while the mainstream environmental movement is notorious for resisting alliances with people of color and grass roots movements.[19] Even though each group needs to assert their identity as aggressively as possible, postmodern identity politics should avoid falling into seriality and sheer fragmentation. These struggles, though independent of one another, should be articulated within counterhegemonic alliances, and attack power formations on both the micro- and macro-levels. Not all universalistic appeals are ideological in the sense criticized by Marx; there are common grounds of experience, common concerns, and common forms of oppression that different groups share which should be articulated -- concerns such as the degradation of the environment and common forms of oppression that stem from capitalist exploitation and alienated labor. The New Political Terrain To overcome alienation and oppression, the implementation of radical democracy is proposed by a variety of tendencies within postmodern theory. In modern democratic theory, the notion of representative democracy superseded in liberal capitalist societies the stronger forms of participatory democracy advocated by the Greeks and modern theorists like Rousseau, Bakunin, and Marx. The postmodern political turn, then, involves a radicalization of the theme of participatory democracy which is advocated in a variety of fields and domains of social life. Within the mode of theory, the democratic turn involves a shift toward more multiperspectival theorizing that respects a variety of sometimes conflicting perspectives rather than, as in modern theory, seeking the one perspective of objective truth or absolute knowledge. In opposition to discourses of the unity of absolute truth, postmodern micropolitics stresses difference, plurality, conflict, and respect for the other. In science, the postmodern turn involves increased emphasis on the scientific community and the various ways that consensus is reached, competing hypotheses are tested, and knowledge is gained through dissensus and the exploration of contrasting positions, as well as coming to agreement over facts and theories.[20] While modern science often remains an elitist and domineering enterprise, multicultural science recognizes the contributions to knowledge of diverse cultures and renounces the arrogance of believing that only the Western way of knowing is valid and that all other forms of knowledge are inferior and defective. In art, postmodern democracy involves increased collaborative work in multimedia, renouncing the myth of the great artist and even decentering the theory of the author, seeing that all art involves a form of collaboration and cultural dialogue (see Best and Kellner 1997, Chapter Four). In postmodern culture, there is emphasis as well on public arts, on public access television, community radio, Internet activism, and on developing more interactive forms of politics and culture that include popular participation. Indeed, the postmodern turn involves seeing how the audience is part of the collaborative process, that art involves participation of the audience in the creation of meaning and aesthetic significance, thus overcoming the divisions between the author, work, and audience, reified by some versions of modernist aesthetics. The emphasis on the motif of the popular unites postmodern developments in theory, the arts, science, and politics. In various fields, there is renunciation of the elitism and specialization endemic to the modern paradigm in favor of discourse and works that are more accessible to popular audiences. Of course, this is not always the case and postmodern theoretical discourse is often as obscure and inaccessible -- if not more so -- as some modern discourse. Yet emphasis on the popular, on democratic participation, and on effective communication in the public sphere provides a counterforce to postmodern obscurantism. In addition, postmodern culture tends to be more inclusive rather than exclusive, celebrating plurality, difference, and the acceptance of otherness. To be sure, some forms of identity politics are separatist and privilege the standpoint and interests of other groups in an exclusivist fashion, but the participatory democratic strain of the more progressive aspects of the postmodern mitigate against such exclusivity and separatist politics. Attacks on hierarchy and domination in postmodern theory thus provide the basis for a more egalitarian and democratic vision in a diverse areas of human life. Yet it would be a mistake to draw too sharp a distinction between the modern and postmodern paradigms and to vilify the modern as the site of all that is repressive and retrograde, and the postmodern as the mode of progressiveness and emancipation. There are regressive and progressive aspects in both the modern and postmodern traditions and we are claiming that we are currently suspended between two historical epochs -- the modern and the postmodern --, each of which has its own theoretical articulations and discourses, narratives, forms of art and cultural expression, scientific paradigms, politics, and modes of everyday life. The problem for those of us trying to theorize this great transformation, this rapid move into a new space, is to think together the modern and the postmodern, to see the interaction of both in the contemporary moment and to deploy the resources of both modern and postmodern theory to illuminate, analyze, and critique this space. We would thus support a postmodern politics which overcomes the contradiction between modern politics and the more extreme versions of postmodern politics.[21] This project requires a reconstruction of politics drawing on the traditions of modern politics and the new discourses and trends of a postmodern politics. Such a politics would overcome the one-sided and non-dialectical squabbles between advocates of modern and postmodern politics and would provide a more viable and inclusive politics for the future. Whereas there are obvious problems with a modern politics that attempts to develop a universal model for all times and all places irrespective of differences and specificities, there is still the need for a normative vision and political principles and norms that respect the rights and discourses of others, that support a politics of alliance and solidarity which seeks the common and public interests of individuals in a given society, and that aspires to a higher ground above the special interests of particular groups. Thus, modern theories such as Marxism remain an crucial form of criticism today, providing indispensable categories to analyze and criticize exploitation, alienation, class struggle, and capitalist economic and cultural hegemony, none of which has disappeared in the postmodern world. Indeed, what we are witnessing today on a global level is the intensification and perfection of capitalist domination in the form of the mushrooming of transnational corporations which resist regulation and control, growing levels of economic inequality, increased monopoly control of key resources and technologies, the revival of child labor and sweatshops, the privatization of state functions, and upheavals due to capitalist reorganization and restructuring. Yet Marxism can no longer rely on the hopes that the struggles of the industrial proletariat and construction of socialism will automatically provide liberation or that this scenario is guaranteed by history. The events of the past decade have shown that certain versions of orthodox Marxism are flawed and that the Marxian tradition must be rethought and invented anew to make it relevant to the challenges of the future.[22] Thus, we should avoid both the characteristic deficiencies of a modern politics that is grounded in an excessively universalizing political discourse that occludes differences and imposes a general dogmatic political schema which is held to be a foundational and not-to-be questioned arbitrator of political values and decisions. In addition, we should reject a postmodern identity politics that renounces the normative project of modern politics, that refuses common and general interests as intrinsically repressive, and that thus abandons a politics of alliance and solidarity in favor of the advocacy of one's own special interest group. Instead, a new politics would mediate the differences between the traditions, creating new syntheses that would strive for a higher ground based on common interests, general philosophical principles, and a renunciation of dogmatism and authoritarianism of whatever sort. A new postmodern politics would also overcome the Eurocentrism of modern politics and valorize a diversity of local political projects and struggles. Although globalization is creating a more homogenized and shared world, it is doing so unevenly, thus proliferating difference and heterogeneity at the same time it produces resemblance and homogeneity. New syntheses of the global and the local, new hybridities, and an increased diaspora of many peoples and cultures is creating a novel situation in which modernization processes are reaching the far corners of the world and a postmodern global culture is found everywhere at the same time that new syntheses of the modern, postmodern, and premodern are generating differences and heterogeneity.[23] Thus, to the extent that modernization processes now include postmodernization processes, such that NAFTA, GATT, and the World Bank are bringing the cultures and technologies of developed postindustrial societies to developing societies, these societies must confront not only rapacious capital, repressive state control, and the exploitation of labor, but also mass media, cultural spectacles, computer technologies, new cultural identities, and so on. In this situation, a postmodern politics must learn to be at once local, national, and global, depending on specific territorial conditions and problems. While sometimes only local struggles are viable, a new politics must also learn how to go beyond the local to the national and even global levels, requiring new forms of struggle and alliance against the growing power of transnational capitalism, the superstates that remain the dominant political forces, and the rapidly expanding culture industries of contemporary technocapitalism. Rethinking politics in the present conflicted and complex configurations of both novel and established relations of power and domination thus requires thinking through the complex ways in which the global and the local are interconnected. Theorizing the configurations of the global and the local also requires developing new multidimensional strategies ranging from the macro to the micro, the national to the local, in order to intervene in a wide range of contemporary and emerging problems and struggles. To the slogan, "Think globally, act locally," we may thus add the slogan, "Think locally, act globally." From this perspective, problems concerning global environmental problems, the development of a global information superhighway, and the need for new global forums for discussing and resolving the seemingly intransigent problems of war and peace, poverty and inequality, and overcoming divisions between the haves and the have-nots may produce new conceptions of global citizenship and new challenges for global intellectuals and activists. Yet it is impossible to predict what forms a future postmodern politics will take. Such a postmodern politics is open and evolving, and will itself develop in response to changing and perhaps surprising conditions. Thus, it is impossible to sketch out the full parameters of a postmodern politics as the project is relatively new and open to further and unpredictable developments. In this novel and challenging conjuncture, the old modern and new postmodern politics both seem one-sided. Power resides in macro and micro institutions; it is more complex than ever with new configurations of global, national, regional, and more properly local forces and relations of power, generating new conflicts and sites of struggle, ranging from debates over "the new world order" -- or disorder as it may appear to many --, to struggles over local control of schools or the environment. This situation thus requires new thinking and politics as we approach a new millennium. Concluding Comments Our contemporary situation thus finds us between the modern and the postmodern, the old and the new, tradition and the contemporary, the global and the local, the universal and the particular, and any number of other competing matrixes. Such a complex situation produces feelings of vertigo, anxiety, and panic, and contemporary theory, art, politics and everyday life exhibit signs of all of these symptoms. To deal with these tensions, we need to develop new syntheses of modern and postmodern theory and politics to negotiate the novelties and intricacies of our current era. Indeed, both modern and postmodern positions have strengths and limitations, and we should seek a creative combination of the best elements of each. Thus, we should combine modern notions of solidarity, alliances, consensus, universal rights, macropolitics and institutional struggle with postmodern notions of difference, plurality, multiperspectivalism, identity, and micropolitics. The task today is to construct what Hegel called a "differentiated unity," where the various threads of historical development come together in a rich and mediated way. The abstract unity of the Enlightenment, as expressed in the discourse of rights or human nature, produced a false unity that masked and suppressed differences and privileged certain groups at the expense of others. The postmodern turn, conversely, has produced in its extreme forms warring fragments of difference, exploding any possible context for human community. This was perhaps a necessary development in order to construct needed differences, but it is now equally necessary to reconstruct a new social whole

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, a progressive community in consensus over basic values and goals, a solidarity that is richly mediated with differences that are articulated without being annulled. Thus, one of the main dramas of our time will be which road we choose to travel into the future, the road that leads, in Martin Luther King's phrasing, to community, or the one that verges toward chaos. Similarly, will we take the course that leads to war or the one that brings peace? The one that establishes social justice, or ever grosser forms of inequality and poverty? Will we stay on the same modern path of irrational growth and development, of the further expansion of a global capitalist economy (the world of NAFTA and GATT) that has generated seeming permanent economic, of social, and environmental crisis, or will we create a sustainable society that lives in balance with the natural world? Will we chart a whole new postmodern path, blind to the progressive heritage of the past, with all its attendant snares and dangers? Or will we stake out an alternative route, radicalizing the traditions of modern Enlightenment and democracy, guided by the vision of a future that is just, egalitarian, participatory, ecological, healthy, happy, and sane?[24] The future will depend on what choices we make, hence we must intelligently and decisively develop a new politics for the future. In this way, we can begin to develop a politics of alliance and solidarity equal to the challenges of the coming millennium.

# 2AC

### 2AC- Coalition !

#### Accusational politics stifles progress and is founded on the structures that they criticize – coalition building is best

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Social media doesn't start these conversations, it amplifies them. Tweets and online articles feed each other and create increasing polarisation and conflict. Feminists are occupied by seemingly endless, frustrating cycles of accusation, defensiveness and recriminations. These have an attendant drag on our motivations for continued engagement. But this is a politics of representation, a process of looking at who speaks for whom about what. Our attention needs to move towards a politics of change: re-visioning a shared future and working towards its realisation through activism. In doing so, we may also open up more fruitful arenas for discussion. Being part of a movement can be exhilarating. After isolated years of being the only one who thought a certain way, I found the relief of working with others who felt the same way incredible. However, when women further marginalised by other structures of power struggle for their priorities to be taken seriously and mechanisms for dealing with challenges do not work, this causes ruptures. Multiple movements have struggled to deal with these tensions. A lot of the conflict in the feminist movement has focused on a word. Originally elaborated by academic Kimberle Crenshaw, intersectionality simply describes the truth that experiences depend on all aspects of a person’s identity rather than just one. All women are not the same. Sexism, racism, transphobia, homophobia, class privilege, immigration status, geographical location and other forms of dominance and oppression do not operate independently but are inherently interconnected. For example, black women in abusive relationships have to deal with racism and patriarchy. They may be unwilling to report their partners, knowing black men are disproportionately targeted by the state, due to the racial profiling inherent in the wars on terror, drugs and crime. They also (increasingly) face a lack of services that centre race and gender and deal with other relevant issues, like the application of immigration law and policy. Assertions that using the word “intersectionality” is elitist and inaccessible for working class women have been met with counter assertions that this position is inherently condescending. The defenders of intersectionality point out that a movement that so easily learnt, adopted and internalised the word patriarchy is applying a double standard. In this way, the use of a word becomes a political position activists take. Attacks on intersectionality as a word are taken as covert attacks on the analysis and action it requires. After years of trying to expand horizons to centre the lives of women like those we know, this can feel like a complete rejection of our efforts and ourselves from the movement. This is also why there is such a strong reaction when a journalist writes an article about feminism without mentioning one black woman. We view this as the white dominated movement (again) not taking the contributions and realities of black women seriously. Similar processes are at play when feminists make transphobic comments, organise events in non-accessible venues or without facilities for those who are deaf or focus on “power feminism” without realising this is likely to exclude women from many class backgrounds. On the other hand, those who are challenged are often confused by what they perceive as attacks. They have genuine intentions to work for the rights of women. They have spent a lot of time and energy trying to mobilise, organise and take action. That this is not recognised can be difficult to understand. As human rights activist Jane Barry says: “A betrayal in the activist world is one that cuts the deepest.” Political differences can get very personal very quickly – both in how they are expressed and experienced. Fighting hurts. The emotional pain caused can lead towards the urge for self-preservation through avoidance. Or it can be expressed through striking back to try and engage. There is an obvious need to reconfigure ways of thinking and working: to forge alternative ways forward. Reaching across the divides and focusing on integrating these discussions within collective activism rather than relying on remote conversations may be part of the answer. As I have written elsewhere, the conflict we see in feminism and other movements is not bad. It is a sign of underlying tensions rising to the surface. If dealt with properly, it ensures the dynamism and change we need. The problem is that we continue to deal with tensions in ways that are based on patriarchal, hierarchical, capitalist and adversarial forms of 'problem solving’ and ‘conflict resolution’. These approaches mean one person or side ‘wins’, rather than finding the best way forward for everyone. People talk (or rather tweet, or blog) at each other to make their point. We are not making meaningful attempts to communicate by hearing and responding to what is being said. Most disappointingly, the underlying issues are aired but continue to be unaddressed. There may be more awareness of the word intersectionality among a particular type of (online) feminist but knowledge as to what it means, let alone how to put it into practice, is sorely lacking. Increasing our collective vocabulary alone is not a sign of success. What matters is the impact this has on the movement and through this on wider society as a whole. This is not to say conversations we have been having are not important. They are vital. This is why our collective time and energy has been taken up with them. Dealing with issues of exclusion and marginalisation within movements is not a distraction from ‘our real work'. And everyone needs to make their own decision about where they want to focus the limited amount of time that is left over after being in or looking for employment, studying, and caring for family and friends. It is valid to devote energies to working on the movement. Not enough importance is given to the difficult and unglamorous work of mobilising and movement building. Yet, many of us seem to have decided to prioritise tweeting about writing about talking about theoretical concepts instead. Social media creates a tendency to be sucked away into discussions rather than making conscious decisions to do so. I cannot be the only person to have become engrossed in writing or tweeting only to realise that it is 3am in the morning, I have not done the activist work I planned to do and I have to be up in a few hours. What are we not doing because so many of our resources as a movement are taken up with this? There has not been enough of a coherent, concerted feminist response to closures of violence against women services, the removal of legal aid, the conditions in factories overseas where the clothes and equipment we use are made, attacks on the rights of immigrants, or changes in the benefits system. All of these have serious detrimental impacts on the physical, emotional or financial security of women. Each also reinforces and ossifies gender norms, whether it be that women are less able to leave abusive partners or that the gender pay gap has widened for the first time in five years. We cannot just forge on with seemingly never-ending Twitter debates and hope they will be the solution. Unresolved tension is one of the key reasons why movements disintegrate. People grow increasingly frustrated or disengage to save themselves from emotional pain. What our movements aim to achieve is too important to let this happen. Let us take steps now, ensuring we find ways of connecting and communicating with each other that reflect the society we wish to create; one where we recognise and affirm the humanity of each other, redress imbalances between the powerful and weak and act with genuine intentions. Of course, the destructive rather than constructive nature of these conversations is not without precedent. Leafing through my birth issue of Spare Rib is similar to reading a series of blog posts today. The exact content may have changed but the language, arguments and emotions remain the same. Despite this there has been no concerted effort to find out and learn from the histories of our movements around conflict or to pass on this information. When I ask older feminists about how they found a way past what happened, they tell me it is through working together in activism. The campaign to abolish no recourse to public funds is just one example of women recognising multiple axes and hierarchies of power and difference and reaching out across them. The campaign brought a core feminist issue (violence against women) together with a cornerstone of anti-racist work (discriminatory treatment of immigrants). It looked at one of the most marginalised and overlooked groups of women, recent immigrants experiencing domestic violence, who had to ‘choose’ between remaining in an abusive marriage or return to countries of origin where they were at risk of stigma and persecution. Almost thirty black feminist, women’s rights and human rights organisations, including Southall Black Sisters, the Women’s Resource Centre and Amnesty International, led the campaign. With the support of allies in parliament and the media, such as Baroness Helena Kennedy QC, they were – partially - successful. They did intersectionality rather than just talking about it. They kept the focus on the legal and social change that was necessary and, in doing so, found ways to circumvent the wahala of so-called ‘identity politics'. Issues of power, exclusion and marginalisation should inform our activism. This has to be in terms of prioritisation of issues, whose realities we address and representation. When we do this, we move towards a more holistic vision of ensuring all are being carried forward by a movement purported to be universal in nature. Enough of paying lip service to concepts like ‘inclusion’, ‘diversity’ and ‘intersectionality’. Let us now focus on doing them in practice.

### 2AC- Whiteness

#### Colonialist-political structures the world – not anti-blackness ontology- it is a political system that sustains exclusion through contingent practices- this gives us the tools to dismantle the system

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Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the othe , , , , , , ,,,,r and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-“white” – modes of struggle are not (just) “psychic” 6 but involve the “reactivation” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant “object” that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity.

### Subotnik

#### Advocacy which prioritizes personal experience makes public deliberation impossible

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77

[\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] It is because ofthis conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the rightand ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications  [\*698]  for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

### Clarke

#### Methods have to be compared against each other --- They don’t win for using their method, but the argument that they should shuts down deliberation.

Lynn **Clarke**, Department of Communication Studies and Theatre, Vanderbilt University, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 20**04**., p. 319-21

Notwithstanding the importance of creative speech to philosophy of language and to a community’s self-formation, it remains unclear whether the collective resistance embodied in AAL meets certain interests expressed by those in whose name it is theorized. To be sure, and as Yancy argues, oppositional speech matters to the lives of the oppressed. Yet, questions remain about the terms and relations of Nommo’s creativity and its significance for AAL. Conceptually, there is no account of whether Nommo is oriented toward coerced or communicatively reasoned terms of communal harmony. This absence raises a question of relation: Should AAL be understood as linguistic resistance without intent to relate to self-defined black individuals who disagree with black majoritarian terms? Put another way, do the terms of Yancy’s AAL community open a space of interaction within “Black America” for the sort of opposition that Yancy’s linguistic framework defends? Equally important, do these terms direct attention to speech practices that have the potential to render the dissent productive of black people’s deliberation on the legitimacy of their community’s self-understanding? Extending the boundaries of humane community a bit further, might the power of Nommo move beyond the constitution of African American identity, experience, and community, to promote the intersubjective transformation of oppressive social norms as Fanon both worked for and hoped (Fanon 1967, 100, 222)? Asked in brief, these questions may be folded into two queries: what compass of creative power should a philosophy of language attribute to (the speech of) AAL, and how might this power be held accountable to the very members of the community in whose name(s) AAL is said to create? If there is good reason to commend the presupposition of shared nonidentity that informs these two questions, neither a sheerly instrumental Nommo nor a sheerly oppositional theory of AAL may do.2

Addressing the second question first, the problem of holding power accountable to those in whose name it speaks is apparent in certain deployments of Nommo as instrumental force. The speech practice of “call and response” is a striking example. In Yancy’s invocation of Nommo to account for this dynamic “co-signing and co-narrating of a shared communicative reality,” a speaker makes “a verbal point” to an audience charged with responding (293). The conceived, expected response is one of “approval.” If not received, the audience will likely be deemed “‘dead.’” Knowles-Borishade, who comes closest to thinking the question of Nommo and dissent, offers a somewhat different account. In it, responders co-create the caller’s “message—the Word” by either sanctioning or rejecting it “spontaneously during the speech,” based on “the perceived morality and vision of the Caller” and “the relevance of the message” (Knowles- Borishade 1991, 497–98). According to Knowles-Borishade, call and response aims at “consensus” determined by “the people themselves” (493–94). Through the process of “checks and balances” that constitutes call and response, “levels of perfected social interaction” are promoted. Yet, in Yancy’s and Knowles- Borishade’s discussions of call and response, an account of disagreement and its potential to hold power accountable does not appear. At most, disagreement is figured as privatized rejection. The grounds of this response remain unknown to the speaker and audience members, among whom reasons for dissent may vary. In the face of silent rejection, the accounts of AAL’s call and response are mum on what ought happen next. The dead audience plays no transparent cognitive- practice role. The caller is free to cast his word-spell.

The absense of accountability in a sheerly productive word appears more readily in Asante’s conception of African communication. In it, the group is thought to take precedence over the individual (Asante 1998, 74). To Asante, this “strong collective mentality” warrants a focus on the aesthetic dimension of speech in “traditional African public discourse.” The focus is relatively narrow, prompting a declaration that, “The African speaker means to be a poet; not a lecturer,” inducing “compulsive relationships” and invoking the audience’s “inner needs” through “the inherent power” of “concrete images” (91). Though reason may matter on this account of Nommo, it is tough to see how and why. Indeed, talk of reason appears relatively unimportant in Asante’s “traditional” understanding of African public discourse (75, 90–91). Creativity’s “highlight” shines in the absence of an explicit role for communicative reason in public speech.3 Accountability appears as a non-issue, lurking uncomfortably in the shadow of creative power.

### ROB

#### Their deployment of identity/social location/privilege arguments shuts down effective collective action – this reifies racism and leads to endless squabbling about authenticity

ROB 2013 Carleton College, JD candidate, Tim Wise & The Failure of Privilege Discourse, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-wise-failure-privilege-discourse/

I don’t find it meaningful to criticize Tim Wise the person and judge whether he’s living up to some anti-racist bona fides. Instead, I choose to focus on the paradigm of “White privilege” upon which his work is based, and its conceptual and practical limitations. Although the personal is political, not all politics is personal; we have to attack systems. To paraphrase the urban poet and philosopher Meek Mill: there are levels to this shit. How I Define Privilege There are power structures that shape individuals’ lived experiences. Those structures provide and withhold resources to people based on factors like class, disability status, gender, and race. It’s not a “benefit” to receive resources from an unjust order because ultimately, injustice is cannibalistic. Slavery binds the slave, but destroys the master. So, the point then becomes not to assimilate the “underprivileged”, but to instead eradicate the power structures that create the privileges in the first place. The conventional wisdom on privilege often says that it’s “benefits” are “unearned”. However, this belief ignores the reality and history that privilege is earned and maintained through violence. Systemic advantages are allocated and secured as a class, and simply because an individual hasn’t personally committed the acts, it does not render their class dominance unearned. The history and modern reality of violence is why Tim Wise’ comparison between whiteness and tallness fails. White supremacy is not some natural evolution, nor did it occur by happenstance. White folks \*murdered\* people for this thing that we often call “White privilege”; it was bought and paid for by blood and terror. White supremacy is not some benign invisible knapsack. The same interplay between violence and advantage is true of any systemic hierarchy (class, gender, disability, etc). Being tall, irrespective of its advantages, does not follow that pattern of violence. Privilege is Failing Us Unfortunately, I think our use of the term “privilege” is no longer a productive way for us to gain a thorough understanding of systemic injustice, nor is it helping us to develop collective strategies to dismantle those systems. Basically, I never want to hear the word “privilege” again because the term is so thoroughly misused at this point that it does more harm than good. Andrea Smith, in the essay “The Problem with Privilege”, outlines the pitfalls of misapplied privilege theory. Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered… Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Dr. Tommy Curry says it more bluntly, “It’s not genius to say that in an oppressive society there are benefits to being in the superior class instead of the inferior one. That’s true in any hierarchy, that’s not an ‘aha’ moment.” Conceptually, privilege is best used when narrowly focused on explaining how structures generally shape experiences. However, when we overly personalize the problem, then privilege becomes a tit-for-tat exercise in blame, shame, and guilt. In its worst manifestations, this dynamic becomes “oppression Olympics” and people tally perceived life advantages and identities in order to invalidate one another. At best, we treat structural injustice as a personal problem, and moralizing exercises like “privilege confessions” inadequately address the nexus between systemic power and individual behavior. The undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Bigger than Tim Wise However, the problem with White privilege isn’t simply that Tim Wise, a white man, can build a career off of Black struggles. As I’ve already said, White people need to talk to White people about the historical and social construction of their racial identities and power, and the foundation for that conversation often comes from past Black theory and political projects. The problem for me is that privilege work has become a cottage industry of self-help moralizing that in no way attacks the systemic ills that create the personal injustices in the first place. A substantive critique of privilege requires us to get beyond identity politics. It’s not about good people and bad people; it’s a bad system. It’s not just White people that participate in the White privilege industry, although not everyone equally benefits/profits (see: Tim Wise). Dr. Tommy Curry takes elite Black academics to task for their role in profiting from the White privilege industry while offering no challenge to White supremacy. These conversations about White privilege are not conversations about race, and certainly not about racism; it’s a business where Blacks market themselves as racial therapists for White people… The White privilege discourse became a bourgeois distraction. It’s a tool that we use to morally condemn whites for not supporting the political goals of elite black academics that take the vantages of white notions of virtue and reformism and persuade departments, journals, and presses into making concessions for the benefit of a select species of Black intellectuals in the Ivory Tower, without seeing that the white racial vantages that these Black intellectuals claim they’re really interested in need to be dissolved, need to be attacked all the way to the very bottom of American society. Dr. Tommy Curry, Radio Interview The truth is that a lot of people, marginalized groups included, simply want more access to existing systems of power. They don’t want to challenge and push beyond these systems; they just want to participate. So if we continue to play identity politics and persist with a personal privilege view of power, then we will lose the struggle. Barack Obama is president, yet White supremacy marches on, and often with his help (record deportations, expanded a drone war based on profiling, fought on behalf of US corporations to repeal a Haitian law that raised the minimum wage). Adolph Reed, writing in 1996, predicted the quagmire of identity politics in the Age of Obama. In Chicago, for instance, we’ve gotten a foretaste of the new breed of foundation-hatched black communitarian voices; one of them, a smooth Harvard lawyer with impeccable do-good credentials and vacuous-to-repressive neoliberal politics, has won a state senate seat on a base mainly in the liberal foundation and development worlds. His fundamentally bootstrap line was softened by a patina of the rhetoric of authentic community, talk about meeting in kitchens, small-scale solutions to social problems, and the predictable elevation of process over program — the point where identity politics converges with old-fashioned middle-class reform in favoring form over substance. I suspect that his ilk is the wave of the future in U.S. black politics. Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene Although it has always been the case, Obama’s election and subsequent presidency has made it starkly clear that it’s not just White people that can perpetuate White supremacy. Systems of oppression condition all members of society to accept systemic injustice, and there are (unequal) incentives for both marginalized and dominant groups to perpetuate these structures. Our approaches to injustice must reflect this reality. This isn’t a naïve plea for “unity”, nor am I saying that talking about identities/experiences is inherently “divisive”. Many of these privilege discussions use empathy to build personal and collective character, and there certainly should be space for us to work together to improve/heal ourselves and one another. People will always make mistakes and our spaces have to be flexible enough to allow for reconciliation. Though we don’t have to work with persistently abusive people who refuse to redirect their behavior, there’s a difference between establishing boundaries and puritanism. Fighting systemic marginalization and exploitation requires more than good character, and we cannot fetishize personal morals over collective action.

### Suleri

#### The 1ac’s deployment of personal anectdotes to create an essential black female counter-gaze create an oppressor/victim dichotomy that reinscribes colonialism –

Suleri 92 – professor of English, focuses on postcolonial studies (“Woman Skin Deep:Feminism and the Postcolonial Condition” [Critical Inquiry](http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=criticalinquiry) > [Vol. 18, No. 4, Summer, 1992](http://www.jstor.org/stable/i257771) )

The body that serves as testimony for lived experience, however, has received sufficient interrogation from more considered perspectives on the cultural problems generated by the dialogue between gender and race, along with the hyperrealist idiom it may generate. Hazel Carby help- fully advocates that black feminist criticism [should] be regarded critically as a problem, not a solution, as a sign that should be interrogated, a locus of contra- dictions. Black feminist criticism has its source and its primary motivation in academic legitimation, placement within a framework of bourgeois humanistic discourse.6 The concomitant question that such a problem raises is whether the signi- fication of gendered race necessarily returns to the realism that it most seeks to disavow. If realism is the Eurocentric and patriarchal pattern of adjudicating between disparate cultural and ethnic realities, then it is surely the task of radical feminism to provide an alternative perspective. In the vociferous discourse that such a task has produced, however, the question of alternativism is all too greatly subsumed either into the radical strategies that are designed to dictate the course of situated experience, or 6. Hazel V. Carby, Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist (New York, 1987), p. 15. into the methodological imperatives that impell a work related to Woman, Native, Other such as bell hooks's Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black. While the concept of "talking back" may *appear* to be both invigorating and empowering to a discourse interested in the reading of gendered race, the text Talking Back is curiously engaged in *talking to itself*; in rejecting Caliban's mode of protest, its critique of colonization is quietly narcissistic in its projection of what a black and thinking female body may appear to be, particularly in the context of its repudiation of the genre of realism. Yet this is the genre, after all, in which African-American femi- nism continues to seek legitimation: hooks's study is predicated on the anecdotes of lived experience and their capacity to provide an alternative to the discourse of what she terms patriarchal rationalism. Here the unmediated quality of a local voice serves as a substitute for any theoretical agenda that can make more than a cursory connection between the condition of postcolonialism and the question of gendered race. Where hooks claims to speak beyond binarism, her discourse keeps returning to the banality of easy dichotomies: "Dare I speak to oppressed and oppressor in the same voice? Dare I speak to you in a language that will take us away from the boundaries of domination, a language that will not fence you in, bind you, or hold you? Language is also a place of struggle."7 The acute embarrassment generated by such an idiom could possibly be regarded as a radical rhetorical strategy designed to induce racial discom- fort in its audience, but it more frequently registers as black feminism's failure to move beyond the proprietary rights that can be claimed by any oppressed discourse. As does Trinh's text, hooks's claims that personal narrative is the only salve to the rude abrasions that Western feminist theory has inflicted on the body of ethnicity. The tales of lived experience, however, cannot function as a sufficient alternative, particularly when they are predicated on dangerously literal professions of postcolonialism. Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics, hooks's more recent work, rehearses a postcolonial fallacy in order to conduct some highly misguided readings of competing feminisms within the context of racial experience. She establishes a hierar- chy of color that depressingly segregates divergent racial perspectives into a complete absence of intellectual exchange. The competition is framed in terms of hooks's sense of the hostility between African-American and Third World feminisms: The current popularity of post-colonial discourse that implicates solely the West often obscures the colonizing relationship of the East in relation to Africa and other parts of the Third World. We often forget that many Third World nationals bring to this country the same kind of contempt and disrespect for blackness that is most frequently associated with white western imperialism.... Within femi- nist movements Third World nationals often assume the role of mediator or interpreter, explaining the "bad" black people to their white colleagues or helping the "naive" black people to understand whiteness. ... Unwittingly assuming the role of go-between, of mediator, she re-inscribes a colonial paradigm. What is astonishing about such a claim is its continued obsession with a white academy, with race as a professional attribute that can only reconfigure itself around an originary concept of whiteness. Its feminism is necessarily skin deep in that the pigment of its imagination cannot break out of a strictly biological reading of race. Rather than extending an inquiry into the discursive possibilities represented by the intersection of gender and race, feminist intellectuals like hooks misuse their status as minority voices by enacting strategies of belligerence that at this time are more divisive than informative. Such claims to radical revisionism take refuge in the political untouchability that is accorded the category of Third World Woman, and in the process sully the crucial knowledge that such a category has still to offer to the dialogue of feminism today. The dangers represented by feminists such as hooks and Trinh is that finally they will represent the profession as both their last court of appeal and the anthropological ground on which they conduct their field work. The alternative that they offer, therefore, is conceptually parochial and scales down the postcolonial condition in order to encompass it within North American academic terms. As a consequence, their discourse cannot but fuel the criticism of those who police the so-called thought police, nor is it able to address the historically risky compartmentalization of otherness that masquerades under the title of multiculturalism. Here it is useful to turn to one of the more brilliant observations that pepper Gayatri Spivak's The Post-Colonial Critic. In concluding an interview on multiculturalism, Spivak casually reminds her audience that if one looks at the history of post-Enlightenment theory, the major problem has been the problem of autobiography: how subjective structures can, in fact, give objective truth. During these same centuries, the Native Informant [was] treated as the objective evidence for the founding of the so-called sciences like ethnography, ethno- linguistics, comparative religion, and so on. So that, once again, the theoretical problems only relate to the person who knows. The person who knows has all of the problems of selfhood. The person who is known, somehow seems not to have a problematic self.9 Lived experience, in other words, serves as fodder for the continuation of ¶ another's epistemology, even when it is recorded in a "contestatory" posi- ¶ tion to its relation to realism and to the overarching structure of the ¶ profession. ¶ While cultural criticism could never pretend that the profession does ¶ not exist, its various voices must surely question any conflation of the pro- ¶ fessional model with one universal and world historical. The relation ¶ between local and given knowledge is obviously too problematic to allow ¶ for such an easy slippage, which is furthermore the ground on which the ¶ postcolonial can be abused to become an allegory for any one of the ¶ pigeonholes constructed for multiculturalism. Allow me to turn as a con- ¶ sequence to a local example of how realism locates its language within the ¶ postcolonial condition, and to suggest that lived experience does not achieve its articulation through autobiography, but through that other third-person narrative known as the law.

# 1AR

### Hundleby

#### Don’t put white people on the scent for their survival strategy ---- even hinting at it turns the K

Hundleby 2005 (Catherine, U of Windsor, The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets, Hypatia, 20(4), Fall 2005, p. 44-58)

Given the two distinguishable forms of oppositional secrecy, the question remains what political reasons generally keep people who oppose oppression from revealing or investigating the secrets of the oppressed despite the potential understanding to be gained. How does a person guided by standpoint theory decide when an oppositional secret may be revealed? How does an intellectual activist against oppression, who may or may not share a particular experience of oppression, know when to resist revealing or investigating politically justified secrecy? Whether one shares the particular experience of oppression, or shares the secret itself, the most obvious reasons for respecting the secrets of the oppressed rely on moral and political considerations. The political project of emancipa- tion depends on keeping the secret, at least to some extent or in some way, and so an inquirer must be aware that violating that secrecy jeopardizes those who participate in it. The cost may be even their lives. Clearly, no foreseeable substantial moral or political threat to the participants in a secret can result from a permissible revelation. How is the threat to the oppositional project recognized and evaluated? People tend to resolve such dilemmas by seeking out those who share in the form of oppression, and those who are already trusted in sharing the secret. In the wrong hands, secrets are dangerous, can be misused, and indeed can reinforce the circumstances of oppression, however noble one’s intentions. The type of ignorance encouraged by social privilege may make a knower unaware of the dangerous implications of a particular piece of knowledge for the welfare of marginalized people. Consider how white or straight folks may be oblivious as they “out” and thus endanger a person who is passing. To ward off potential danger, one appeals to the immorality of disrespecting the secrets of others. The decision of when and how to reveal a secret is left as much as possible to the judgment of those whose secret it is.4 The more removed one is from the content being hidden—whether or not the circumstance involves oppression, but with special care if it does—the less political authority one has to evaluate that circumstance and to investigate or share the secret.5 So, one avoids revealing or inquiring into the sexual or racial identity of others. The person or people in question judge best the full practical and political import of open identification.

### McClendon

#### They say “black-aesthetic” --- that’s homogenizing and essentializes how resistance shoud look like, which creates a failed politics

John h. **Mcclendon** III, Bates College Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 20**04**. P.308-9

Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—especially the impact of class contradictions—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in The German Ideology, I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly be argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of Yancy’s (and Smitherman’s) vindicationism, where he argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language.

When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African Ameri can culture, viz. that African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance. There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression, for, by way of example, not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in “heaben” and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one “as white as the snow.” Or that loyalty to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest folly. The modern day connotation for “Uncle Tom” did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing “Toms.” It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence “Tomto- us” is mentioned among African American political speakers.

After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser’s, Denmark Vesey’s, and Nat Turner’s slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loyal to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. The idea that social ontology and identity among African Americans, past and present, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture.

Albeit, resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture, nonetheless, it is not exhaustive of its actualities and even of its future possibilities. African American culture in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance. Rather, African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able, for analytical purposes, to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of accommodation. This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support via vindicationism.